THE EXPOSITORY TIMES.

Notes of Recent Exposition.

When G. M. Trevelyan resigned the Chair of Modern History at Cambridge on being appointed Master of Trinity he was succeeded in the office which he had held with such distinction by Mr. Herbert Butterfield. It was no light and easy task to which Mr. Butterfield fell heir, but he has already achieved a wide reputation on his own account. His public lectures in the University of Cambridge in 1948 were so successful that he was invited to broadcast on the same theme in the Third Programme in 1949. All who heard the lectures when broadcast will welcome the opportunity of possessing them in amplified and permanent form in the book entitled *Christianity and History*.[1]

The first thing to say about the book is that it is extraordinarily cheap at the price, and that any one possessing a library ought to secure it as a matter of course. The book not only displays the extreme competence expected of the holder of such a distinguished Chair, it also wins a place for itself by the distinction of its style, and in particular by the vividness of its phrasing.

The subject of Christianity in its relation to History is by its nature inexhaustible, and contributions are forever being made concerning one aspect or another of this wide theme. One has only to think of C. H. Dodd's 'History and the Gospel' or Niebuhr's 'Faith and History,' or of the work of Tillich or Collingwood to realize how carefully the meaning of history is being discussed in our own day.

In his Introduction, Professor Butterfield reminds us that Christianity is an historical religion 'in a particularly technical sense that the term possesses — it presents us with religious doctrines which are at the same time historical events or historical interpretations. In particular it confronts us with the question of the Incarnation, the Crucifixion and the Resurrection, questions which may transcend all the apparatus of the scientific historian but which imply that Christianity in any of its traditional and recognizable forms has rooted its most characteristic and daring assertions in that ordinary realm of history with which the technical student is concerned.' He points out that such an historical religion must affect the manner in which men apprehend historical events or meet historical vicissitudes whether in their own actual lives or when they are reading about the past. He then declares that the principal challenge and most formidable threat to Christianity to-day, namely the Marxian creed, is based upon an interpretation of history, and he makes it plain that he is prepared to treat that challenge as both a dangerous and a respectable one. In other words, it is the doctrine of man, his nature and his destiny, that provides the battle-ground to-day, and obviously the historian must have something to say here that is extremely relevant.

This theme is developed in his chapter entitled 'Human Nature in History,' which he lights up by discussions like that concerned with the question: Was Napoleon better than Hitler? 'The historian—especially as he shares the defects of human nature himself — cannot say whether Napoleon or Hitler made the most of the opportunities heaven gave to each of them. He cannot decide which of these men is better or worse in the eyes of Eternity. What history does is rather to uncover man's universal sin.' The final sentence in this chapter is revealing: 'It is essential not to have faith in human nature. Such faith is a recent heresy and a very disastrous one.'

Passing to the theme of Judgment, Professor Butterfield makes it clear that he firmly believes judgment to exist in history, although its verdicts are an interim affair and not final. 'What many would deny of course is the view that this form of judgment is a judgment of God. It is embedded in the very constitution of the universe, but those who do not believe in Christianity will hardly admit that it is there by any providential and purposeful ordination.' He believes that judgment in history falls heaviest on those who come to think themselves gods, who put their trust in man-made systems and worship the work of their own hands. 'Supposing there is a man like Hitler and we even concede that he

[1] Bell; 7s. 6d. net.

may be utterly unselfish in his passion for his country, still if there is a moral judgment in history it tells us repeatedly that such a man by aping providence blasphemes God, and brings more rapid tragedy on the world and on himself than the people who give half their lives to wine, women, and song.' Similarly, he declares that if men put their faith in science and make it the be-all and end-all of life, there is something in the very composition of the universe that will make it execute judgment on itself if only in the shape of the atomic bomb.

Succeeding chapters deal with Tragic Conflict in History, Providence and the Historical Process, and Christianity as an Historical Religion. The chapter on Providence deserves, as indeed the whole book does, very careful reading and re-reading. Again he remarks that the hardest strokes of Heaven fall in history upon those who imagine that they are playing Providence not only for themselves but for the far future. 'It is a defect in such enthusiasts that they seem unwilling to leave anything to Providence, unwilling to leave even the future flexible.' Of deep significance for many of us is his saying that it is agreeable to all the processes of history that each of us should do the good that is straight under our noses. There is sermon material in his declaration that those people work more wisely who seek to achieve good in their own small corner of the world and then leave the leaven to leaven the whole lump, than those who are for ever thinking that life is vain unless one can act through the central government, carry legislation, achieve political power and do big things. Again he declares that we fly in the face of Providence if we demand too great security for the future. 'What is not permissible, for a Church at any rate, is to believe that Providence is going to cease its care for the world or rob even disasters of their possible compensations, whatever the next turn in the story may be, or whoever may win the next war.'

Occasionally we are able to discern the man behind the historian as when Professor Butterfield declares that he is unable to see how a man can find the hand of God in secular history, unless he has first found that he has an assurance of it in his personal experience. 'Our interpretation of the human drama throughout the ages rests finally on our interpretation of our most private experience of life.' Most interesting and arresting are his references to some particular happenings, and reflecting on these he says that when we think of the action of God in history, we need not imagine a heavy hand interposed to interfere with the working of a heavy piece of machinery. Perhaps a better picture of our situation would be that of a child who played her piece very badly when she was alone, but when the music teacher sat by her side played it passably well, though the music teacher never touched her, never said anything, but operated by pure sympathetic attraction and by just being there. 'Perhaps history is a thing that would stop happening if God held His breath.'

His conclusion is that he sees no reason why Christians should be shy of trusting in Providence, regarding it as a living and active agency both in ourselves and in its movement over the length and breadth of history. It guarantees a mission in the world and the kind of triumph that may come out of apparent defeat.

One can well understand the chorus of approval that has greeted the publication of this book, for it continually sets the mind aglow. Open it where you will, and the fruit of a powerful Christian mind is evident. Even his last sentence is rewarding: 'Hold to Christ, and for the rest be totally uncommitted.'

Mr. Denis Hayes, who was Publications Editor to the Central Board for Conscientious Objectors from 1941 until 1947, has already told in 'Conscription Conflict' of the forty years' struggle which, in 1939, resulted in the introduction of peace-time conscription in Great Britain. In a more recent work, *Challenge of Conscience*,[1] he tells the story of the following ten years, culminating in the National Service Act, 1948.

It may be allowed to be a careful and comprehensive record, and even that it may become the standard work on the subject (which is one in which our readers must be interested, in its religious and Christian aspect at least). Though the author does not conceal his sympathies, he writes in a fair-minded way and tells his story with a certain objectivity and detachment. But surely a remark such as the following—à propos of the National Service (Amendment) Bill, 1948—betrays bitterness of spirit and is not in the best of taste: 'So a Bill to amend the consolidating Act was introduced forthwith and rushed through both houses so as to become law before members left to celebrate the birth of the Prince of Peace.' Mr. Hayes seems to take it for granted that the Christian conscience in the United Kingdom is in the custody of the Conscientious Objectors.

In a Foreword Mr. Fenner Brockway, Chairman of the Central Board for Conscientious Objectors,

[1] Allen and Unwin; 15s. net.

who served several sentences as a political objector in the First World War, says that toleration and respect for personality have been the working principles of the Board, and in them lay the secret of co-operative endeavour on the part of its members. He makes indeed a remarkable claim for the members of the Board: 'We have been pacifists and non-pacifists, we have had members of every religious denomination from Catholics to Quakers and we have had agnostics, we have had "absolutists" who believe that any compulsory service in war-time is wrong and we have had members of the Non-Combatant Corps, we have had a captain in the Fire Service, we have had Socialists, and we have had Individualists—and yet in ten years we have scarcely had one dispute or contentious word.'

In writing his book of the Conscientious Objectors of the Second World War Mr. HAYES found the abundance of material to be positively embarrassing. In pursuing his task of selection he has aimed, first, at achieving quality and, secondly, at striking a balance between interest and usefulness. He appears to have succeeded in both those aims. But we warn our readers that they must not expect to find here any set discussion of the relation between Christianity and pacifism. The book is concerned 'with the men and women who claimed a conscientious objection to compulsory service connected with war, how they maintained a stand for peace in a society organized for victory, how they were treated by the authorities and the public.'

In one of the chapters the question is asked whether there was such a thing during the Second World War as could be properly described as a 'C.O. Movement.' 'That there was a pacifist movement was undoubted; that there were individual C.O.s outside the pacifist movement was equally clear. But was there any distinctive feature of the C.O., any common factor, that would justify the epithet for the collection of individuals concerned?'

It should be observed that to become a C.O. was not in itself to form a personal link with others, such as one does in joining a political party or pacifist fellowship. It was simply to apply to a Government official to be registered as such. This was no guarantee of a common basis of allegiance; for some C.O.s gave their loyalty to Christ, others to pacifism, socialism, or internationalism. Mr. HAYES maintains, however, that a mutual bond, however tenuous at times, did develop between those who took the stand of conscience, whatever their basis.

Thus his answer to the question propounded in the chapter is in the affirmative. In the time of war there was, he says, a 'C.O. Movement,' though when the War ended and men and women returned to civil life the uniting bond that had developed among C.O.s was dissolved, or largely so. That was because what united the men and women of the 'C.O. Movement,' through conscience, was not pacifism, seeing that a proportion of the political objectors were non-pacifist, but a common opposition to compulsory military service for the prosecution of the War then in progress.

Mr. HAYES frankly allows in the same chapter that during the Second World War many C.O.s were lost to the Movement, chiefly through 'insufficient depth of conviction.' This root-cause led not a few to accept from the Tribunal a less degree of exemption than they had claimed to be necessary; for example, non-combatant duties instead of work in a hospital. Even a large proportion of the 'absolutists' when faced with the clear choice of compliance or prison chose to comply. Economic pressure, the protraction of the War, and changes in world circumstances also tended to reduce the number of C.O.s.

'In 1939 and 1940, for example, Communists and near-Communists registered as C.O.s on purely political grounds, strenuously disclaiming at the same time any tendency to pacifism. The German attack upon the Soviet Union quickly dispelled their scruples. Others, fortified perhaps by Trade Union blessing, and inspired by Labour's entry into the Government, felt that the War had become, after all, a workers' struggle, and acted accordingly.'

Passing from the problem of conscience, Mr. HAYES goes on to remark on the less political and more religious outlook of the C.O.s of the Second World War as compared with the First. Of the seventeen constituent organizations of the Central Board, twelve were religious in character, two broadly humanitarian, and three political. The result was an altogether quieter type of C.O. The struggle shifted from opposing conscription to maintaining the right to individual objection. A disappointing record from Mr. HAYES' point of view. But several factors in it he finds heartening; in particular, the vindication of the right of individual choice which was the guiding principle of the Central Board—its vindication against the day, far distant as it may be, when peace shall reign and wars shall be 'but a curiosity of history.' But it should be added that many long and look for that day who are still persuaded that the way to bring it on is not the way of pacifism.

Prophecy and Prediction.

By The Reverend Roderic Dunkerley, B.A., B.D., Ph.D., Hockley, Essex.

Old Testament prophecy was of course not primarily or principally prediction. 'Of this meaning,' Sir George Adam Smith said, 'it is perhaps the first duty of every student of prophecy earnestly and stubbornly to rid himself.' The prophets were in the first place and chiefly 'messengers to their own generation, preachers of righteousness, missionaries of repentance, advocates of reform.' They proclaimed the will of God in the contemporary situation, applying the truth as they knew it in their own hearts to the needs of their hearers as individuals and as nations—in praise and blame, in hope and warning.

But naturally prediction is often involved. Insight into God's will inevitably leads to foresight regarding the results of accepting or rejecting it. The prophetical books therefore contain much forecasting of the future, and this is no doubt one reason why the old misunderstanding of the nature of prophecy lingers so obstinately. But of course such forecasts of the future are not fixed and irrevocable—they are conditional on the reaction of the prophet's hearers and others, on their moral response or lack of it to the teaching given.

The classic statement of this principle of *contingent prophecy* is in Jer 18^{7-10}: 'At what instant I shall speak concerning a nation, and concerning a kingdom, to pluck up, and to pull down, and to destroy it; If that nation, against whom I have pronounced, turn from their evil, I will repent of the evil that I thought to do unto them. And at what instant I shall speak concerning a nation, and concerning a kingdom, to build and to plant it; If it do evil in my sight, that it obey not my voice, then I will repent of the good, wherewith I said I would benefit them.' In Jer 26^{17-19} we have an actual example of this principle at work, in the case of Micah whose prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem (Mic 3^{12}) was not fulfilled because Hezekiah and the people repented of their evil doings. And in Jon 3^{10} we have a parabolic instance of the same thing—Nineveh accepting the message of the prophet and turning from evil before the threatened doom fell and so gaining release from it.

This principle was well expressed by Jerome—'Many of the prophecies were given, not that they should, but that they should not, be fulfilled.'[1] A good modern statement of it is Davidson's—'The prophecies were designed to influence the conduct of the people; they were moral teaching, of the nature of threats or promises, which might be revoked or fulfilled according to the demeanour of those to whom they were addressed.'[2] Or more briefly Farrar put it thus—'Their menace always implied an *unless*.'

Now this point is of special importance for New Testament study in two ways. We cannot properly understand how Jesus fulfilled Old Testament prophecy if we ignore this contingency principle. Far more and far better things had been promised when Messiah came than actually happened, but they were conditional on a response that was not forthcoming. Again, in His own anticipations of the future there are forecasts of success that should have been achieved but were not, because they received Him not. I have worked out both these points fully elsewhere,[3] and therefore will not deal further with them now. It is very strange that this principle has been so commonly overlooked in connexion with the life of Jesus; when it is consistently applied it brings reality and coherence into the story to a remarkable degree.

My purpose now is to raise a different issue. Are there not other ways in which the future can be forecast, and is not pure prediction sometimes possible—definite not contingent, fixed and certain and irrevocable? And if so, has not this fact also a bearing on our understanding both of the Old and of the New Testaments?

We may begin with ordinary facts of life—scientific and mathematical prediction, the exact anticipation of sunrise and sunset, of high and low tides, of eclipses and other natural events. Dr. H. E. Fosdick once pictured astronomers going out to Africa to study an eclipse and standing at last on the veldt beside their instruments. 'Now,' said one, watch in hand, 'if we have made no mistake in our calculations, the eclipse should begin at once.' On the instant the shadow of the moon pushed its edge over the rim of the sun![4] Such predictions are based on knowledge of all the relevant factors—and on the impossibility of any outside interference taking place.

The possibility of accurate weather forecasts seems to be growing as knowledge of the causal conditions increases, and it may be that predictions of other natural phenomena such as eruptions and earthquakes will become possible in due course.

[1] H.D.B. iv. 126.

[2] *Ib.*, 125.

[3] The Expository Times, lix. [May, 1948].

[4] *The Meaning of Prayer*, 104.

But another factor enters here. Some animals seem to have sensibility to coming storms and atmospheric changes, and old country-folk often show the same sort of awareness. Is this a purely physical reaction or is there a psychical plus? It is certainly not knowledge of all the facts, in the scientific sense.

An allied case of a curious nature may be cited. Professor E. E. Speight says: 'During the years I was lecturing in the Imperial University of Tokyo I never felt safe. In that country I had constant experience of impressive influence on the mind of natural forces which man can do little to counteract. My body had become like a living seismograph in that land of rapid barometric changes, of sudden and appalling thunder-storms, floods, tidal waves, and constant earth-tremors. In July 1921, two years before the Great Earthquake, I wrote in a Tokyo daily: "There are signs of a disaster of a volcanic nature brewing in the bowels of the earth, as this ominous summer goes by. . . ." The last evening I was in Japan I was dining with Professor Omori, the famous seismologist, and Dr. Miura, the Emperor's private physician, and I said to them, "A great disaster is coming, and very soon; I have felt it approaching all the year." For we had had as many as thirty-nine shocks one night, and once a strange leaping of the earth. But Professor Omori laughed and said, "There is no use in arguing with a poet." All the same, it was with an unaccountably deep sadness that I left Japan.' That was in May 1923, and the earthquake which caused such extreme devastation and distress occurred on 1st September of the same year.[1]

How do coming events cast their shadows before? There may be a chain of physical causation stretching forward from the present to the future, and by a scientific knowledge of the links the future may be read—as when the time of high tide at London Bridge can be calculated for next Christmas Day. But where there is no such knowledge the links may still be there, and a psychical awareness of some of them may come to people gifted with a certain sensibility. That seems to be a rational hypothesis. Professor Omori's remark about arguing with a poet is interesting, and it may well be that the poetic temperament is akin to or includes this sensibility as one of its ingredients. Shelley once said, 'Poets are the hierophants of an unapprehended inspiration, the mirrors of the gigantic shadows which futurity casts upon the present.'[2] Which brings us back again to the Hebrew prophets. It is a commonplace to say that the greatest of them were poets; may they not have had this poetic susceptibility to coming events to a greater degree than has often been supposed?

A query must be inserted at this point before we proceed to our next main thought. Such chains of causation in natural events can only lead to prediction if there is no outside interference breaking the chain. That is obvious and has been implied above. But Professor Speight spoke of 'natural forces which man can do *little* to counteract.' Are there perhaps possibilities of such counteracting influences disturbing sequences and so invalidating predictions based upon them? I am inclined to think that facts may presently compel us to pause before asserting as dogmatically as of old that thought can have no direct influence, say, on the weather. Dr. J. B. Rhine's experiments in Psycho-kinesis may call for a revision of that and other generally accepted views. Dr. C. E. M. Joad, in reviewing Dr. Rhine's work said, 'Is it really credible that minds can by willing produce a direct effect upon the movements of matter at a distance? The answer is that we are not entitled to dismiss it as incredible so long as we have to admit (a) that minds do constantly produce effects upon those pieces of matter which are brains and bodies, as when I lift my arm, and (b) that we have not the faintest idea how they do so. While the meaning of mind-body interaction remains so completely mysterious we are not entitled to deny the possibility of mind-object interaction.' We will not pursue this interesting speculation at the moment, but that it has a bearing on the question of prediction is obvious.

Returning now to the main line of our argument, may it not be true that there are chains of causation in human affairs similar to those in the material world, and that such sequences lead from the present conditions into the future and must work out in a certain way—*unless there is interference*? Granted an orderly working out of cause and effect, certain things will eventuate. And if we were able to know all the facts and factors involved we could foresee and predict future events—always with the proviso that nothing interfered, that no intruding circumstances broke through the chain as a result of human freedom.

Now at this point the uncomfortable facts of clairvoyance and second sight come into the picture. That they are facts it seems to me impossible to deny. From books like H. F. Saltmarsh's *Foreknowledge* and G. N. M. Tyrrell's *The Personality of Man*, it appears proved that certain persons under certain circumstances do have paranormal perception of things happening elsewhere and of what is going to take place in the future. Take one example, the famous story of the lady who dreamed three times over a long

[1] *The Poetry Review*, November–December, 1934, p. 439 f.

[2] *A Defence of Poetry*.

interval that her uncle would be brought home dead, having fallen from his horse at a certain spot known to her. All the details of the arrival home and the body being carried upstairs were imprinted on her mind. And after some years it happened as dreamed in exact detail.[1] The facts are vouched for in the *Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research* and it is not my intention to dispute them in any way.

Many attempts have been made to explain precognition but I confess that at present I am not happy about any of them. It may be that we shall come to believe in four or more dimensions and find all the difficulties solved. Or in what Mr. Saltmarsh calls 'the specious present'; when we speak of the present moment we do not mean a mere infinitesimal moment of time but a brief period of duration—and the 'specious present of the subliminal region may cover a much longer period than that of the conscious region.'[2]

But I am not satisfied that a much simpler approach is not possible. May it not be that to certain people of psychic sensibility the results of certain chains of causation may become apparent under certain circumstances, so that they perceive what will be the outcome of an action or set of actions—*unless anything breaks through the sequence*? In the story quoted the lady who had the dream begged her uncle never to go alone on that road, but he did not comply. We can imagine him pooh-poohing the whole business! But supposing he had taken it seriously and given up riding! A link would have been snapped, the chain would have been broken, and the precognition would have been a warning. Which brings us back again to the conception of contingent prophecy.

To say that he could not have done this is to deny human freedom. And other stories in the same 'foreknowledge' context suggest more forcibly this real possibility of free human choice breaking the sequence of foreseen events and in some measure altering the outcome. There is the case of a mother who felt constrained to fetch her child in from where she was playing by the railway—and shortly afterwards an engine ran off the lines and crashed just where the child had been.[3] And of the American officer who had arranged to take his boys to a theatre one night but during the day seemed to hear a compelling voice repeatedly urge him not to do so. In spite of all the inevitable objections that were raised he accepted the warning. The theatre was burnt down that night with great loss of life.[4]

Is it not credible that in such cases events were moving directly toward tragedy, and that for some reason paranormal perception of what was eventuating was given to certain people? There may have been nothing arbitrary about the 'gift'; if there had been more people on the spot psychically equipped or attuned more might have been done to break the chain. Possibly some others did receive fleeting glimpses or hints of peril ahead but pushed them aside, as so many of us would have done under the circumstances. If such an explanation does not cover all the facts or meet all the difficulties, I believe that it does at least suggest that the idea of contingency entering into this business of precognition is worthy of greater consideration than it sometimes receives.

Now, what is the relation of these facts to the question of prophecy? If in addition to recognizing such psychical possibilities we have faith in a living God, then surely we must believe that He does know all the facts in every case, and therefore can see the end from the beginning—except in so far as He allows human interference. And if we accept the fundamental conception of prophecy—that God does speak in the hearts and through the lips of men ('Thus saith the Lord')—then we surely cannot easily dismiss the idea of genuine prediction. It may well be that only those receive such inspiration as are both spiritually and psychically capable of it, and that psychical sensibilities can be instruments in God's hand as well as other human qualities. But it would seem a natural and almost inevitable thing that God-inspired men should have more than an ordinary foresight based on a wise human insight—that they should on occasion receive a deep and even a detailed certainty regarding coming events in their relation to present moral issues.

But if this is true then many old arguments about *vaticinia post eventus* will have to be revised. It has been so customary and so easy to dismiss in this way Biblical predictions which have been fulfilled. The Parable of the Wicked Husbandmen, Jesus' predictions of the destruction of Jerusalem, Peter's denials, and many other passages have been ruthlessly dealt with in this way. Guignebert was a past-master in this destructive art, and of course the Form Critics. I am not, of course, denying the possibility of passages being embellished and elaborated after the event, but I do maintain that the considerations advanced here should make us demand much more solid argument than is usually offered.

Many years ago, Blass, in contending for an early date for Luke's Gospel, rejected the plea that it must have been written later than the destruction of Jerusalem. 'Luke makes Jesus foretell it, which is quite sufficient, for coarse and vulgar reasoning, to lead to the conclusion that the author wrote after the event.' In support of

[1] Tyrrell, *op. cit.*, 76.
[2] *Ib.*, 94.
[3] *Ib.*, 75.
[4] *Ib.*, 74.

his argument he quoted the interesting case of Jerome Savonarola, who in 1496—the year before his death—foretold the capture of Rome which happened in 1527. His sermons in which the prophecies occur were printed in 1497, so that all possibility of *vaticinium post eventum* is ruled out quite definitely. The most striking prediction is this: 'Rome, thy churches will be made stables for the horses, which they will place therein.' This actually took place. But in 1496 it was a startlingly unlikely thing to happen. In any ordinary war they would have been spared by Catholic soldiers, 'but in this case were not at all respected, because a great part of the conquering army consisted of German Lutherans, for whom the Roman Catholic churches were rather objects of hatred and contempt than of veneration. Now Lutheranism did not exist in 1496.'[1] Purely literary considerations may, of course, affect our judgment of Scripture passages which contain apparent predictions; that is a point with which we have nothing to do at present. But it seems clear and certain from what has been said here that genuine predictions are possible and do indeed take place.

I do not mean to imply by 'genuine' that no element of contingency is involved. We have seen reason to think it was so in various cases of apparently exact fulfilment, and it may be that it is really present in all such cases. I believe that Jesus's forecast of Peter's denial was in reality a warning of what would certainly happen unless he exerted his free will and resisted the onrush of temptation, as he was able to do. And even in the case of Savonarola, who can say that the war might not have been averted if something like a revival of spiritual vision and vigour had taken place at Rome. Human interference on a grand scale! We have not yet reached a final answer then to the question whether prediction is ever fixed and irrevocable.

And I believe there is something to be said on that point. For if God is not a prisoner in His own universe, must He not have the power of initiative—of starting a course of action or a chain of causation? Was not the promise of the Messiah of that order of prediction—'There *shall* come forth a rod out of the stem of Jesse, and a Branch *shall* grow out of his roots'? Sometime and in some way this had to be—God saw the necessity and pledged that it would happen. If human interference obstructed in one way, He would accomplish His purpose in another. It was an irrevocable prediction. Moreover, if human freedom can break some chains of causation and so interfere with some expected fulfilments, must not God's greater freedom be able also to change the course of events by wise interference? May not Isaiah's confidence in the inviolability of Jerusalem in 701 B.C. have been based on a divinely given certitude to this effect? Some new thing is initiated—a rumour from Nineveh or a scare of attack in the rear or what not—and the apparently irresistible siege of the city is raised. Who is to say that such things cannot be?

We must maintain the freedom of God as well as the freedom of man. And the possibility of prediction, both contingent and irrevocable, seems to be directly connected with these postulates. I do not believe the future is in all respects fixed and determined—such an idea plays havoc with the moral sense. Neither can I doubt the reality of the links between the present and the future, and that these can in some measure be known. But the last word in the business is not with psychical research, any more than it is with the exponents of a 'coarse and vulgar reasoning.' It is with God and man—co-operating to His glory and our well-being.

[1] *Philology of the Gospels*, 43.

Literature.

REFORM IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND.

It would appear that the Church of England is facing a crisis in its relationship with the State. When in 1917 Dr. William Temple led the Life and Liberty Movement it was understood that failure to achieve a certain measure of reform would be followed by an application to Parliament for disestablishment. But in the course of the years Temple came to be of the conviction that the State needed a national church, so that even the rejection of the Prayer Book Measures of 1927 and 1928 did not bring about a real crisis. But the situation has now in no small degree changed. Dr. Cyril Garbett in his recent book, *Church and State in England* (Hodder and Stoughton; 15s. net), issued from his See of York, has gone the length of affirming that if the State deliberately and repeatedly refuses to grant the reforms which the Church regards as essential for spiritual freedom, then the Church will have to ask for disestablishment. Not only so, but

while his book was still unfinished, the Church Assembly had passed an important resolution on the relationship between Church and State: 'the Assembly while valuing the Establishment of the Church of England as an expression of the nation's recognition of religion, nevertheless is of the opinion that the present form of it impedes the fulfilment of the responsibilities of the Church as a spiritual society, and therefore instructs the Standing Committee to appoint a small Commission to draw up resolutions on changes desirable in the relationship between Church and State and to present them to the Assembly for consideration at an early date.' The implications of this resolution are obvious.

One must not give the impression that the Archbishop of York is seeking to force the policy of disestablishment upon the Church. On the contrary, he appears to be quite as anxious as his predecessor was that the Church should retain its State connexion. But it must no longer be to the detriment of its function as a spiritual society. State connexion must not mean the continuance of State control. Even since the passing in 1919 of the Enabling Act, under which the Church has been able to secure a large number of reforms, no Measure has been carried which has modified the relationship between Church and State. 'The State still has the power it possessed over the Church at the time when the whole nation belonged to the Church and when every Member of Parliament was a churchman. The Crown still appoints its chief officers; Convocation cannot meet and Canons cannot be made without the approval and licence of the Crown; the public worship of the Church cannot be legally altered without the approval of Parliament; the final Court to interpret Church doctrine is appointed by the Crown; and a large number of administrative reforms are still impossible unless they are agreed to by Parliament.' In view of this situation Dr. Garbett says the Church must now decide on the changes necessary for its spiritual freedom and ask the State to sanction them. He has, however, useful and it may well be valuable suggestions to make on the vexed questions of the appointment of Bishops, the revision of Canon Law and of the Prayer Book, and the reform of Church Courts; these are intended to ease the situation and avoid the 'drastic surgery' of disestablishment. But anything like establishment on the model of the Church of Scotland—an Established Church yet Free both in principle and in practice—he regards as a vain dream.

It is in the second part of the book that the discussions relating to the present crisis in the Church of England are to be found. In the first part, or rather mainly in the first part, we find a clear and masterly sketch of the historical background from which the current problems of Church reform have emerged. It is shown how the Church has never been free, but has been subject to the successive controls of the Papacy, the Crown, and Parliament; and how in the nineteenth century the tension between Church and State began to increase as the State became more powerful and secular and the Church more aware of its Divine origin and mission. All through this historical part references are made with scrupulous care to authoritative writers, and the argument is illustrated or lightened by personal reminiscences and reflections that impart a certain genial individuality to the book.

The whole book reflects a tolerant and sympathetic outlook, and if in places it shows signs of hasty preparation that may well be pardoned in a church administrator so active, zealous, and preoccupied as is the present Archbishop of York.

W. FULTON.

COMMUNISM.

Since Harold Laski wrote his little book on Communism in the Home University Library in 1926 many volumes have been written on some aspect of the same all-commanding subject. One of the latest of these is entitled *Kingdom of This World: The Challenge of Communism* (Mowbray; 6s. net) and the writer is Professor M. V. C. Jeffreys, of the Chair of Education in the University of Birmingham. It is written from a fully Christian point of view in the endeavour, in response to the appeal of the Anglican Bishops in the Lambeth Encyclical, to enable Christian people to study the theory and practice of Communism. The book is a small one, consisting of a hundred and eight pages, with an Appendix on Persecution, but it is packed with good things, and bears every evidence of the work of a powerful mind. There are references to some of the most recent literature on the subject. Books like 'The God that Failed' are referred to, and also Butterfield's recent lectures. The author begins with a discussion of the meaning of 'The Kingdom.' 'On the one hand is the belief in the Kingdom of this world, man-made in historical time. The strength of such a faith lies in its firm offer to deliver the goods—its right, on its own hypothesis, to disregard moral claims which interfere with the accomplishment of its purpose. The success of the social revolution is the only criterion. There is a clear material appeal to all those who in this world have nothing to lose. And there is no little moral appeal to all those who have a sincere and

disinterested passion for social justice but who have rejected religious belief.'

On the other hand Professor Jeffreys points out that the Christian faith is in a kingdom which, while penetrating this world, is never accomplished here, and that its strength is that it is under no illusion about human nature or the perfectibility of man, and that it reckons realistically with the fact of evil and the continual corruption of all human systems. There follows a discussion of some philosophical problems that are involved in discussing Christianity and Communism, such as those connected with the State and the Individual, Materialism and Idealism, Freedom and Necessity, Means and Ends. After this he comes to grips with Marxism itself, first with Marxism as a religion, and secondly as an economic system, pointing out that Christianity gives no encouragement to a Messianic expectation which takes the form of a perfect society achieved by purely human efforts within the process of history. His critique of Marxism is a most penetrating contribution. One of his most interesting passages provides a comparison of Marxist and Biblical imagery. Next he proceeds to give a brief positive statement of the essentials of Christian doctrine in the course of which he remarks that it did not need an Incarnation, a Crucifixion, and a Resurrection to tell mankind that the world would be a better place if people behaved decently to one another. In his concluding chapter he points out that the fundamental cleavage between Christianity and Marxism is on the questions: (1) whether man can perfect himself and (2), whether the millennium can be equated with the establishment of a certain kind of social order and achieved within the process of history. 'The real issue thus concerns the nature and destiny of man; and on this no reconciliation is possible since Marxism rests on assumptions which Christianity cannot accept.' He points out that we have much to learn from Marxism and that a study of Marxism is salutary not least because 'it severely chastens our complacence and strips our hypocrisy.'

This highly competent summary of the issues that are at stake is worth reading if only for the fact that it emphasizes afresh the necessity of our understanding the force and urgency of the Communist challenge. Amongst Christians it is coming to be fairly generally recognized that the providential significance of the growth of Communism and its hold on such a large section of the human race is to be found in the inspiriting effect it has upon ourselves. We must see to it that we present to the world no debilitated form of our Christian faith and we must resolutely ask ourselves wherein we have been found lacking. This little book contributes powerfully to our resolve.

R. J. WEDDERSPOON.

OLD TESTAMENT PROPHECY.

In September 1946, at the first post-war international meeting of the Society for Old Testament Study, an interesting ceremony took place, when a volume of essays in manuscript was presented to Professor T. H. Robinson, the President of the Society, to celebrate his sixty-fifth birthday. After a delay of over three years, the volume has appeared in print, entitled *Studies in Old Testament Prophecy* (T. & T. Clark; 16s. net). It is a handsome book of over two hundred pages, with an Introduction by the editor, Professor H. H. Rowley, and a list of Professor Robinson's works compiled by Professor Henton Davies, an old pupil of his. The essays are contributed by members and honorary members of the Society, and all who know about the Society's activities are deeply aware of the part played by Professor Robinson in guiding them during the past twenty-three years. He was Secretary from its inception in 1917 to 1946, and has twice been President, in 1928 and 1946. In fact, it is impossible to think of the S.O.T.S. without associating with it the inspiration, sane counsel, and urbanity of Professor Robinson, who is among the most benign of Old Testament scholars.

In conception, then, the book is essentially an S.O.T.S. publication, and in content, too, its interest is primarily for those who have a fair knowledge of Old Testament study. The authors of the essays are either leading British scholars of international reputation, or representatives of foreign scholarship; and in their contributions they never fall short of the very high standard we would expect. There are thirteen essays, all on specialized topics; limitations of space preclude a list of titles, but the following list of contributors should suffice to indicate the excellence of the book: Professors W. F. Albright, the late S. A. Cook, G. Henton Davies, G. R. Driver, O. Eissfeldt, A. R. Johnson, the late A. Lods, C. R. North, J. Pedersen, N. W. Porteous, H. H. Rowley, R. B. Y. Scott, N. H. Snaith.

One would wish for the space to deal with each essay separately, but I may be allowed two or three general observations without, however, implying that the essays mentioned are necessarily of greater interest than the others. Firstly, there is an unexpected uniformity in the contents of the book generally. The title—a natural choice in view of Professor Robinson's own important contributions to the study—suggests a certain delimitation of scope, but even so the discussions are surprisingly convergent, so that, in the editor's

words, 'a greater measure of unity is given to this volume than is often found in similar volumes of essays.' A second agreeable feature of a number of the essays is the inclusion of original translations. I think particularly of excellent renderings of Hab 3 by Albright, Jon 2^{3-10} and other passages by Johnson, passages from Deutero-Isaiah by North, and a translation of a hitherto unpublished Mari tablet by Lods. Incidentally, Albright insists that Hab 3 should be regarded as part of the whole prophecy, and one wonders whether the absence of this chapter from the commentary on Habakkuk in the scrolls from 'Ain Feshkha will cause him to reconsider this view. Thirdly, the tradition of British scholarship in expounding a balanced rather than an extremist view is well maintained. This is present in all the essays, and particularly so in that by Porteous on 'The Basis of the Ethical Teaching of the Prophets.' Here, recent conclusions, especially by Scandinavian scholars, are judicially considered in a less sensational but more convincing manner than they previously appeared to be.

The publishers are to be congratulated on the production of the book; it is excellent—a very important advantage since the subject-matter is necessarily scholarly.

B. J. Roberts.

EVANGELISM AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY.

The falsehood of the familiar jibe that religion is dope for the oppressed and of the notion that the pious care little about projects for social welfare can be easily proved. One old book, 'Gesta Christi,' by C. L. Brace, gives a historical resumé of the practical effects of Christianity. The work of modern medical and educational missions and the social work of the Salvation Army show the evangelistic impulse accompanied by strenuous and carefully planned effort for uplift. A remark I heard in Glasgow fifty years ago was an obvious and unquestionable fact. It was that practically every man then prominent in public life in that city, not only in connexion with religious affairs but in the work of education, hospitals, charities and all sorts of philanthropic efforts, was himself a spiritual product of the revival under Moody and Sankey. And it is a commonplace to note that the Labour Party in its earliest days in England drew many of its leaders and speakers from the ranks of Methodist local preachers.

Dr. E. Douglas Bebb has had the happy thought to demonstrate the large place that economics and social reform held in the teaching and activity of John Wesley himself. His book—*Wesley: A Man with a Concern* (Epworth Press; 6s. net)—does this in a most competent and attractive way, being at once clear, succinct, interesting and backed by careful references.

It may indeed come as a surprise to some to find how definite is this practical line in Wesley from start to finish. As an Oxford student and member of the 'Holy Club' he was busy with prison visitation and the teaching of pauper children. In his American years when he went with youthful zeal to convert the Indians in Georgia, he came into touch as acting secretary to the Governor with the urgent administrative problems of defence, finance, slavery, and liquor. In England his evangelical emphasis on the importance of every man in the sight of God stimulated humanitarian and democratic feeling. He took a stern line against smuggling and dram-drinking. He preached much on the dangers of wealth. He was strongly anti-slavery and did much for education and prison reform.

The value of Dr. Bebb's book is largely in the point it makes and the evidence it gives that all these activities were no casual impulses but were consciously and constantly integrated with his evangelical doctrine. 'Holiness means social action.' 'Christianity is essentially a social religion.' By other-worldliness he meant indifference to the world's rewards and penalties, but not indifference to any call for practical service.

Bishop G. Bromley Oxnam in *Personalities in Social Reform* (Abingdon-Cokesbury Press; $2.00) presents well-informed panegyrics on 'six heroic thinkers and their pioneering work for justice and brotherhood among men.' The book grew out of lectures at Drew on the Ezra Squiers Tipple Foundation and is of interest as an example of high-class American academic eloquence as well as for its admirable accounts of these subjects.

Two are illustrations of the practical attitude of evangelism. Walter Rauschenbusch was a minister and theological professor who had an enormous influence a generation ago in directing American Christianity towards ameliorative action in the social and economic sphere. Bishop Oxnam says 'His social passion leaped artesian-like from the depth of a personal experience of Christ's redeeming love.' It is possible that in retrospect he might be disparaged as a starry-eyed idealist. His 'Prayers of the Social Awakening' are largely finely worded and copious exhortations to the congregation. But it was written of him with justice that his was 'the greatest single personal influence exerted on the life and thought of the American Church in the last fifty years.'

The other Christian evangelical reformer here is Schweitzer. But in David Lilienthal, a Jew, religion is the driving force; and in Gandhi, religion

and politics are inextricably mixed. By way of contrast Beatrice and Sidney Webb stand as examples of unselfish and amazingly effective reforming activity uninspired by any transcendental convictions.

R. W. Stewart.

SECULAR SOCIETY.

The chief merit of *Religion and the New Paganism*, by the Rev. John Pitts, M.A., Ph.D. (Independent Press; 8s. 6d. net), is that in compact form it presents us with a picture of the modern scene from the Christian point of view. Dr. Pitts is minister of the First Presbyterian Church at Bloomfield, New Jersey, and the book provides us with 'an essay in Moral and Political Science from the religious standpoint.' He covers a wide field, dealing with Religion and the New Mood, Religion and the New Psychology, Religion and the New Morality, Religion and the New Politics, and Religion and the New Humanism. The argument throughout is presented with perfect clarity, moves easily from stage to stage, and the points are made in thoroughly effective fashion. If it be objected that he has nothing particularly new to say on any of the subjects with which he deals (the book, he tells us, was first written in 1942), at any rate he presents some aspects of the best and most relevant thinking on each of them. Dr. Pitts finds his starting point in the fact that for the first time in the world's history we are face to face with the problem of the Secular Society, and throughout his book he makes clear the various departments of life in which the secular view has become emphatically pronounced. He remarks that 'in Britain Communism is probably religion's strongest competitor for the allegiance of men's hearts and minds,' a saying that we may perhaps accept with considerable reserve, but in his discussion of Communism and of Totalitarianism generally he shows that he has a powerful grasp of the essential questions involved. He is particularly strong in his treatment of Religion and the New Psychology, and demonstrates most effectively the strength of the Christian point of view as against that of, say, Freud, whom he convicts of the 'fallacy of abnormalism,' pointing out the danger of a theory built only upon experience with abnormal and pathological types. 'Were Freud's patients the only religious people in the world? Were they examples of the religious life at its best? Were they in any sense typical of the great saints of the Church, of the outstanding servants of God? Were they, indeed, typical even of the vast multitude of ordinary Christian people who find in religion, not a cushion to ease life's shocks and jars, but a power to triumph over life's ills and obstacles?' Occasionally Dr. Pitts presents an old argument in a fresh way as when in talking of the distinction between origin and validity he says 'It is no argument against the beauty of the rose to point out that its roots are deep down in mouldering manure. We should be foolish to despise the loveliness of the lily because it grows out of the slime of the pond. Similarly the value of an institution, the truth of an idea, does not depend upon the way it originally came into existence, nor on the way it has since developed.'

Dealing with 'Religion and the New Humanism' Dr. Pitts gives us a most valuable history of the meaning of Humanism, and of the various ways in which it has expressed itself, and shows himself to have studied the best that has been written on this vital modern theme. He closes by expressing the Christian attitude with regard to this Humanism of to-day, by stressing the fact that the concept of God is finally and completely satisfying, that the Christian position finds room for *all* the facts of life, that its doctrine of the last things meets all legitimate aspirations, both personal and social, and that the doctrine of Immortality provides the crowning arch.

This book may well be commended as providing a trustworthy guide for those who are endeavouring to meet the most urgent attacks of to-day, and might well provide a basis for a series of lectures or addresses designed to express the strength of the Christian reply that can be given even when the modern theories are presented in their most specious form. If the book be not strikingly original, at any rate it is thoroughly dependable, and its argument logical and sustained. Had one a criticism to offer it would be that the writer hardly seems to pay enough attention to the Bible itself and does not seem to have made as explicit as he might the fact that the best apologetic for the Faith is still to be found in a Biblical Theology persuasively expounded.

R. J. Wedderspoon.

MENTAL HEALTH.

One of Dr. J. A. Hadfield's early publications was a paper in a symposium on Immortality, published in 1917, and he has not since then wavered in his belief in the influence of the mind over bodily functions and the importance of psychology in the treatment of mental disorders. In his new book—*Psychology and Mental Health* (Allen and Unwin; 18s. net)—he gives us the fruit of ripe experience. Although himself a lecturer on Psychopathology, he prefers to use the term Mental Health, on the ground that the latter is positive and not negative, and suggests early prevention rather than belated cure. Instances of

abnormalities, indeed, occupy a large part of the book, but he keeps always in the forefront the idea of normal health from which these are departures. His definition of mental health as 'the full and free expression of the native and acquired potentialities, in harmony with one another by being directed toward a common end or aim of the personality as a whole,' gives us the key to his method. He is especially interested in the eradication of diseases whose predisposing causes emerge in early childhood, and in the avoidance of fixations—those annoying complexes which frequently 'make trouble when there is none'—which it is almost impossible to remove at a later date. He is interested in the individual rather than in the influence of cultural patterns, because he finds that neuroses are 'ridiculously' similar under different cultures and that under the same culture there is infinite variety. Moreover, it is to the individual we must go for information about the cultural pattern. In connexion with this emphasis, Dr. Hadfield pours considerable scorn on such phrases as 'all men are born equal,' and 'give equal opportunity to all.' Although confessedly indebted to Freud, he considers that his stress upon infantile sexual wishes is excessive, and prefers to find the main and pervasive cause of psychoneuroses in the feeling of the deprivation of love and the repression of the craving for love. The need for security is paramount, and he would agree with another psychologist in holding that the most fruitful development of the child mind is 'adventure on the basis of security.' In the end of the book a beautiful passage points out how psychology might assist in 'the delightful task of providing for the child that atmosphere of protective love in which it will find courage to face life, free to develop, free to love, free to live without fear, and accepting frustration with good grace.'

The book will be of great use even to the non-specialist. The chapter on 'The Sources of Behaviour' is simple and untechnical; the analysis of hysteria is practically applicable; the treatment of sublimation is inspirational; and even to grasp the distinction between 'psychotic' and 'psychoneurotic' is comforting. His general defence of psychoanalysis carries conviction, and encourages us to believe that its pursuit does not merely stir up mud, but enables us to find treasure in the sunken depths of personality.

W. S. URQUHART.

When the Church Was Young is a little book of sermons by the Rev. Clovis G. Chappell (Abingdon-Cokesbury Press; $2.00) on texts in Acts. They are earnestly and effortlessly and pleasantly written and are embellished with mildly interesting anecdotes, but in print hardly support the claim made by the publishers that this is an outstanding preacher. The book is finely bound both as regards texture and design.

In a cleverly artless fashion in the form of letters commenting on Mark, Mr. Roger Hicks in *Letters to Parsi* (Blandford Press; 5s. net) gives the record of leading into Christian faith an Eastern inquirer. It makes a bright little study of Mark. The personal and modern application is always in the forefront, and the sincerity and simplicity are disarming. Because this correspondence effected its happy result it is well worth printing and reading. It shows a mind, in Jesus' phrase, 'wise as serpents' and is addressed to the child-like heart.

It would therefore be a pity if the intrusive use of the particular slang of the Moral Rearmament Group should hamper the reception of an otherwise excellent book. It seems to aim at suggesting that everything is quite simple if it is just put into 'grouper' phraseology. Christ's mission was a 'war of ideas.' Jesus was 'guided to go off to have plenty of time for quiet.' 'His first act was to begin to build a team.' 'James and John were teen-agers.' The disciples 'share,' in the sense of unembarrassed, unreticent, mutual, spiritual self-exposure. 'Guided' describes a decision that it would be impious for others to question. 'A quiet time' means an interval of prayerful receptivity of mind. These are just matters of taste in wording. But the use of 'absolute' in connexion with love and beauty and truth encounters the objection that there is no sense and much complacency in so describing virtues that enlarge as they are sought and cultivated, and in their perfection always lie beyond what has already been attained. It would be difficult, for example, to give a certificate of absolute honesty to the summary offered here of what is known of the origin of the Gospels—that they are four different accounts written by different members of a team that sifted the various stories.

In this deeply suggestive and beautifully written book—*The Message of Life* (Carey-Kingsgate Press; 5s. net)—the Rev. J. Ireland Hasler, B.A., seeks to set forth, in clear and simple language, the missionary message of the New Testament, as this is contained in the Epistles of St. John. The root idea, he finds, is that of 'salvation as life,' and from this point of view he emphasises the positive rather than the negative, the practical rather than the theoretical, and the social rather than the merely individual aspects of the religious life. An

attempt is made to relate the teaching to prevalent Hindu doctrines, and, if this had been carried out a little more fully, the value of the book for its particular purpose would have been increased.

The Colet Library of Modern Christian Thought and Teaching, edited by the Dean of St. Paul's, deals in a non-technical way with Biblical and theological subjects. So far seven volumes have appeared. The one most recently to hand is No. 4 in the series, and is by Canon E. Basil Redlich, B.D.—*The Early Traditions of Genesis* (Duckworth ; 6s. net).

The book deals only with the 'Primeval History' (Gn 1–11). It contains preliminary chapters on the Value of the Traditions, their Historical and Religious Background, and an outline of the Sources-hypothesis. These are followed by translations and excellent running commentaries on the several sections of which the traditions are composed. Full account is taken of the latest archaeological researches as well as of modern science. The unique value of the Bible traditions is effectively brought out. The treatment is rather more simple than that of Professor S. H. Hooke's 'In the Beginning' (*Clarendon Bible : O.T.*, vol. vi.). This little book is admirably suited for use in Bible classes and study groups, either with or without the guidance of the minister.

In the Land of His Love (Epworth Press ; 6s. net), written by Mrs. Minnie Lindsay Carpenter, the widow of a well-known Salvation Army General, is the result of several visits which she and her husband paid to the Holy Land. It shows an attractive eagerness to relate to religious experience the geographical background and the simple facts of the gospel story. At first the narrative is slow moving and its simplicity is a little forced, but it gains in power and beauty as it goes on. There is a realism about the presentation of the influence of Jesus and a sense of dramatic contrast. The chapters describing, for example, His attitude to the city of Jerusalem and His care for the individual are very fitly juxtaposed. And as we go on still farther we find that we have here a book of devotion. The simple facts of the life and death and resurrection of Jesus our Lord are sublimated, as it is meant they should be, into an arresting message to the souls of men in every age and every land.

A Dictionary of Church Music, by Mr. G. W. Stubbings (Epworth Press ; 7s. 6d. net), is an admirably informative and useful compilation of notes mainly on the exact meaning of ecclesiastical and musical technical terms. The reader will have his often vague understanding made definite and will also get much recondite instruction, such as that 'improperia' means not unseemly speech or behaviour, but a particular type of anthem. The author allows himself occasional pungent comments ; as that while a woman's voice does not break like a boy's treble just after it has been satisfactorily trained, yet, on the other hand, it is often difficult to ask a soprano to retire because her aging voice is no longer mellifluous.

Intinction and the Administration of the Chalice (Grosvenor Press, Portsmouth ; 4s. net), by the Rev. T. Grigg-Smith, M.A., Canon Chancellor of Portsmouth, is a well-written, wise, and informative discussion of the practice of dipping the Bread into the Wine in the common chalice in the Eucharistic rite. In the ancient churches of the East, as the Archbishop of York is quoted as saying, Communion in both kinds is by the method of Intinction ; and the Lambeth Conference of 1948 was of opinion that there is no objection to administration by the method of Intinction where conditions require it. In October 1949 the Episcopal Church of America authorized Intinction as an alternative method of administering Holy Communion, subject to the approval of the Bishop of the Diocese. Not the least valuable part of Canon Grigg-Smith's book is its consideration of the practical details of this method.

The Eight Deadlier Sins (Longmans ; cloth, 4s. net ; paper, 2s. 6d. net), by the Rev. Hubert C. Libbey, is published as the Bishop of London's Lent Book. As the Bishop says, it presents a 'highly individual analysis of our more common frailties,' but set 'in the framework of Divine joy and hope.' The Joy of God is the first theme, the God of Hope the last, and the eight intermediate chapters treat of Blindness of Heart, Pride, Vain-Glory, Hypocrisy, Envy, Hatred, Malice, All Uncharitableness. Obviously these eight 'deadlier sins,' culled from the Litany, somewhat overlap the 'seven deadly sins' of pride, covetousness, lust, anger, gluttony, envy and sloth. The author is well aware of it, yet it does not trouble him, as witness these words (characteristic of his vivid, popular style) : 'To steer one's way, by the grace of God, through the seven deadly sins is an achievement that may well win the applause of men, but to steer one's way, again by the grace and power of God, through the eight deadlier sins is an achievement that swings the bells of heaven.'

This little book is to be commended as thoughtful and topical, and as venturing off the beaten track of Christian ethical exposition.

Canon Peter Green is a sturdy optimist upon whom the years have sat lightly. In *Old Age and the Life to Come* (Mowbray; 2s. 6d. net) he vigorously combats the idea that youth is the best time of life, and reprimands distinguished distributors of school prizes for suggesting to their youthful hearers that advancing years will mean diminishing happiness. He thinks that opportunities will increase right up to the end, and that the best is yet to be, provided that in our latter years we face the fact of death courageously, arrange to spend our now limited time in a sensible way, and get rid of pagan ideas of a future life. In his thoughts on immortality he is also sturdy, simple, and non-critical in his beliefs. No shadowy existence for him, but a continuance of a full-orbed personality—body, mind, and spirit. He seems to favour the doctrine of an intermediate state, provided the extravagances of the idea of purgatory are left behind. The final state of the blessed will be one of full activity, modulated by altruism and the all-constraining motive of the love of God. A book of comfort, to be accepted in an uncritical, though not a credulous, spirit.

No one is doing more than Dr. Norman H. Snaith to mediate Bible scholarship to the Bible-reading public. He is a prolific and attractive writer and his latest book should have a ready sale. It is called *The Jews from Cyrus to Herod*, and is No. 2 in a new series of 'Gateway Handbooks of Religious Knowledge,' edited by Dr. Basil Yeaxlee (Religious Education Press; 6s. net).

For many readers the period with which the book deals is a bewildering maze. They could find no more competent and entertaining guide than Dr. Snaith. About a third of the book deals with the political history of the period. In the other two-thirds the religious ideas and movements between the Restoration and the Advent are set into this historical framework. The scope of the series allows little space for qualifications and footnotes, and Dr. Snaith is obliged to put into the form of affirmations matters which may well be in dispute. Thus, his identification of the Suffering Servant with the exiles of 597 B.C. is not very consistent with the statement that 'the returning exiles held that every one who had not been in exile in Babylon was a foreigner, a heathen, and did not belong to the People of God.' Had not the Servant a mission even to the heathen, and is he likely to have been so churlish to his less fortunate fellow-countrymen? Nor is it nowadays quite correct to say that the first four verses of Ps 110 'are generally recognized as an acrostic on the name Simon, the brother of Judas Maccabaeus.' Nevertheless, those who have a blind spot for the period of the Hasmonaeans and Herods will find this book a very real help. And, after all, the period is one of great importance, since it bridges the gap between the prophets and Jesus.

More Characters and Scenes from Hebrew Story, by Miss Hetty Lee Holland, M.A. (S.P.C.K.; 4s. 6d. net), is a sequel to a previous volume by the same writer, and which concluded with the reign of Solomon. The present book continues the story of the Hebrews to the destruction of Jerusalem in A.D. 70. The materials are arranged as a course of lessons for children aged seven to ten plus, and are presented in the form of vivid narrative. The writer has tried to present Hebrew story in such a way that children may not later have anything to unlearn when they become acquainted with Biblical criticism or when they begin to reflect upon the contrast between the ethical standards of the Old and New Testaments. There is no labouring of moral applications, each story being intended to carry its own lesson for children at the ages named. There are good suggestions for the teacher's further reading. An excellent book, and cheap (two hundred pages).

Zwingli and Cranmer on the Eucharist (Seabury-Western Theological Seminary, Evanston, Illinois; 25 cents) is the M. Dwight Johnson Memorial Lecture in Church History given by the Rev. Cyril C. Richardson, Th.D., D.D., Associate Professor of Church History at Union Theological Seminary, New York City. It is a careful and competent attempt to bring out the relationship between Cranmer's opinions on the Eucharist (which were partly rejected in the Thirty-nine Articles, and are not the proper key to the interpretation of the Eucharistic teaching in the Anglican liturgy) and the opinions of the Swiss Reformer to whose Eucharistic teaching Cranmer owed much. Here is the conclusion Dr. Richardson reaches on the question, Was Cranmer a Zwinglian? He was a Zwinglian to the extent that his Eucharistic thought moved within the basic framework of Zwingli's opinions. Yet he is distinguished from the Swiss Reformer in esteeming the Lord's Supper more highly and in emphasizing that its faithful observance is accompanied by the operation of God's grace. 'Barklay' should be spelled 'Barclay.'

Sören Kierkegaard as Major Prophet of the XIXth Century.

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The obvious revival of interest in Kierkegaard (as shown by the copious flow of recent publications about him) may well be due, at least in part, to this generation's impatience of just those faults against which he was in fierce and constant protest. His *Attack on Christendom*, a collection of articles first published in *The Fatherland*, appeared very soon after Carlyle's *Latter-Day Pamphlets*, similarly collected from articles in *The Cornhill*, and the vituperative eloquence so similar in the two is now felt, despite its exaggeration, to have had an element of lamentably neglected truth. It was seriously debated by readers of *The Cornhill* a century ago whether Carlyle had gone off his head or had taken to drink, and many a reader of *The Fatherland*, who had known Bishop Mynster or who knew Bishop Martensen, might have been excused for raising a similar question about Kierkegaard as shown in his account of these prelates. But apart from local or personal applications, now long ago forgotten, there is enduring value in many a principle set forth with matchless effect in these almost contemporary writings. Passage after passage, as Browning would have said, 'finds' the reader of our time, because it is such arresting expression of what the reader has often felt, but knew not how to say. Georg Brandes, no theologian, but supreme in literary appraisal, declared that Kierkegaard had no equal as a writer of Danish prose. This is an estimate which I am altogether incompetent to judge, but I can well believe that the gifts of satiric imagery and of moving pathos, alike at the writer's command, which are so impressive even in translation, must have been still more so in the original text.

I am not, however, here concerned with Kierkegaard's writings as literature. From that point of view, I welcome and share the prevailing enthusiasm. It is the philosophic challenge from this critic of a century ago, now so strenuously revived, that I have in mind. The revival is a stimulant, but it is also a risk. One does not make satisfactory escape from extravagances of one's own time by return to bygone extravagances from which the present sort resulted in large measure through reaction. Thus, amid the chorus of appreciative tributes, as we approach the centenary of Kierkegaard's death (11th November, 1855), I wish to enter a brief critical comment.

He found grave fault, first with Hegel, afterwards with Schleiermacher, for having analysed away the conception of *guilt*. The Hegelian account of the Universe as completely rational, in which anything which the moralist blames is shown to have its place and to have been condemned merely because it was misunderstood (evil being just 'a form of finitude'), seemed to Kierkegaard a flat denial of the witness of conscience. To him the contrast and conflict between moral good and evil must under no circumstances be thus relieved of its sting by reference to a deeper harmony yet to be realized. Such a critical view of Hegelianism would be urged in British Schools as a novelty fifty years after Kierkegaard's time, as when F. C. S. Schiller wrote of 'that higher synthesis of God and the Devil known to Hegelians as the Absolute,' and of their system that 'Whatever else may be said of it, it is at least the death of morals.' Karl Barth's epigram about 'a metaphysical attempt upon the life of morality' has been quoted many times. Side by side with Kierkegaard's attack on Hegelianism was his attack on the system of Schleiermacher for having reduced religion to something purely subjective. What, he asked, can there be of the objective in the 'feeling' which that system makes central? To Kierkegaard it seemed that Schleiermacher's interest was in nothing more than the varieties of religious psychology, in classifying 'experiences,' with no concern as to whether a reality was reflected in them. I think this criticism rested on misconception of what was meant in the *Reden*, although there are passages in that work which lend to it a certain plausibility.

Our concern, however, is with Kierkegaard's own thought, and this is to be gathered from such sources as his *Stages in the Way of Life*, *Fear and Trembling*, *Either—Or*, *Practice in Christianity*. He is the originator of certain new and to some readers utterly baffling terms, of which 'existential thinking' and 'existentialism' (taken over from him later by Barth) have probably caused more bewilderment and irritation than any others. Perhaps a fitting comparison is that which has described him as adopting toward the official religion of Denmark an attitude like that of the Hebrew prophets to the

decadent religious routine of Israel. Hence my heading of this article, 'Kierkegaard as Major Prophet.' He suffered, too, the kind of opprobrium which a seer who makes himself unpleasant to highly placed officials must always expect. It has been widely believed that he was the original from whom Ibsen drew his picture of the priest in *Brand*. The disreputable satiric paper, *The Corsair*, tormented him persistently with its ridicule.

His attack was on the shallow optimism which he found in the current blend of philosophy and theology as represented by divines in the Established Church of Denmark, whom he regarded as mere civil servants employed on 'religious' duty by the Government. In passage after passage he declares it impossible that men holding positions with salary in a State Church should be other than spiritual impostors. That there have been cases calling for such reprobation is not to be doubted; but, with examples of a very different type rushing into his mind, any Englishman or Scotsman will think of those passages as hysterical slander. Of the famous lines (if he had lived to read them) in *The Ring and the Book*,

> The courtly Christian, not so much Saint Paul
> As a saint of Cæsar's household,

Kierkegaard would doubtless have said they supplied a perfect portrayal of Primate Mynster. Whether they did or did not, we have no means of judging, and this critic's habitual way of expressing himself when his temper was raised has shown such unmistakable exaggeration that we need evidence other than his regarding a prelate whom he has denounced. But Browning's lines and Kierkegaard's satiric phrases were not too strong as descriptive of some middle-nineteenth century churchmen, and they are memorable at all times. It is the argument, when rhetoric is for the time suspended and argument is resumed, in the *Attack upon Christendom*, that the great historic religions, with their intense emphasis on 'sin,' reflected far more truly the realities of human experience than did the counterfeiting of those religions at which 'philosophic' theologians had worked so hard.

'Existentialism' will perhaps reveal its meaning most clearly as we note what, in asserting this doctrine, Kierkegaard denies. Here at least he has been explicit. He denies the claim of science to have shown the *reality* where 'the plain man' sees only *appearance*. This doctrine, that 'the real is the rational,' whether in its earliest exposition by Plato or in its Hegelianized version prevalent at the divinity lecture-rooms of Kierkegaard's youth, seemed to him not merely the reverse but the inverse of the truth. What Plato called 'the universal,' modernized as 'the concept,' was to him (as it would be forty years later to F. H. Bradley) a manipulation of the real for some purpose of practical convenience; a selecting of certain qualities or aspects which, under a general name, we agree to treat as 'the essence.' Herein he is in complete sympathy with the onslaught by mediæval Nominalists upon Realism, with a Roscellinus against William of Champeaux, or an Ockham against the epistemology of Aquinas. The so-called *essence*, thus artificially created, 'most necessary, but indefensible' (as Bradley said) does not really exist: to assume it is useful for action, because it simplifies, and its defects or its perversions are negligible for the practical purpose we have in view. But, as one famous agnostic wrote, 'the ragged edges show that we have torn the robe of truth,' and instead of penetrating thus to the vital reality, in an intellectual sense we 'murder to dissect.'

But Kierkegaard was no despairing agnostic: he set the example which Barth would follow of an agnosticism that was 'reverent.' Of the 'existentialism' which is his alternative to 'essentialism' he argues that therein lies the secret of the enduring strength of religion. It lies in man's sense of guilt, in his refusal to acquiesce in spiritual failure, in his consciousness of being at once the sport of non-moral cosmic forces and the bearer of ideals fit to rise above and dominate them. Demonstrate as you will that religion rests on illusions which science has exposed and dissipated: religion, thus intellectually abolished so often and in so many countries for more than two thousand years (from the unbelief of Democritus of Abdera to that of Kierkegaard's contemporaries in Copenhagen) has nevertheless continued just as if those abolishing it had never been born. Moreover, within the ranks of the scientific 'intellectuals' themselves there had arisen an unbelief in philosophic orthodoxy as radical as any ever shown by heretical churchmen toward their inheritance of dogma.

That there was much in this of wise and timely reflection, much of the genuinely prophetic note, the development of thought—especially in the field of Comparative Religion—has made clear. Kierkegaard was writing at a time and in an atmosphere for which what are now truisms in this field were—for very many—unintelligible paradoxes. How his anticipations have come, belatedly, to be discovered, it is hard to guess. But there is no mystery in the thrill the discovery has brought.

Tributes of gratitude must not, however, inhibit criticism. Why, one may well persist in asking,

should his revolt against certain philosophies have prompted Kierkegaard to denunciation of philosophy *as such*? Why not rather insist that it shall include adequate account of vital realities in experience which it has been ignoring or explaining away? That very 'existentialism,' which our prophet advances as substitute for the 'speculative philosophy' against which he rages, may well, in so far as it is sound, be assimilated by just the system which he intends it to displace. The history of criticism for the half century after his time is rich in philosophic amenders who transformed systems of the past so as to give a due place to objections very much the same as his. But philosophy, like the Law and the Prophets in development, was not thus being destroyed; it was rather being fulfilled.

A parallel suggests itself from Kant's revolt against the scepticism of Hume. He revolted on the ground that Hume's account of the process of knowledge was irreconcilable with the judgments of necessity (as contrasted with those of mere uniformity) which we make in mathematics. But Kant did not let Hume's example of failure lead him to give up the quest for a theory of knowledge: he rather prosecuted this quest the more ardently, feeling sure that a bad philosophy was to be cured by a better. In like manner Kierkegaard, revolting against any system which would render illusory those moral convictions which he judged no less real than Kant judged the convictions of mathematics, should have found his remedy in so revising the system as to make its analysis complete and accurate where it had been evasive and partial.

The parallel with Kant may be pushed still further. In rejecting Hume's theory as ultimate account of knowledge, Kant was at pains to show how a confidence in it might naturally, though delusively, arise, and how within limits it had made an important contribution to the systematizing of experience. He did not impute to the advocate of a scheme he rejected any motive more discreditable than honest failure of insight. Contrast this with the Kierkegaardian diatribes! But in turn, and for the same reason, the argument of Kierkegaard should itself be carefully appreciated in respect of the causes which have given it (and are now giving it especially) a notable strength.

A trio of nineteenth century theological writers, whose affinity with one another is obvious, attempted an account of the Universe and of Life which would owe nothing to philosophy. Amid their differences, Kierkegaard, Ritschl and Barth have resembled one another in the enormous importance they attached to the New Testament account of 'sin.' Kierkegaard with his agonies of self-accusation, Ritschl with his 'value-judgments,' Barth with his psychology of the *Epistle to the Romans* as transcript of a soul's experience still—all essentially find the key to the World-Riddle in the moral nature of man as revealed in the New Testament. To all three this has been the source from which light has shone on the character and implications of moral evil. Not a word have they to say about the authentication of this supreme authority. It apparently was accepted as authenticating itself. No direction from a Church, or from a Book bringing attestations of infallibility! To admit the need, or the provision, of this would be to relapse into that mood of speculative reasoning in which these seers had satisfied themselves that one can advance nowhere.

What all three seem to neglect is the difference between the account a philosopher of religion may fitly give of an experience and the content of that experience as one is passing through it. Obviously no more than a very small proportion of those who adopt with complete confidence a moral or a religious theory of the Universe and of Life do so as outcome of speculative argument. Bradley once said that to confuse logic with the art of reasoning and ethics with the art of conduct was to fall into two delusions which 'we should bury, if we are wise, in a common grave.' But though men reasoned well before any one had heard of logic, and showed discernment of good from evil before there was anywhere a moral philosopher, their independence of speculative theory regarding what they did by no means implies that a speculative theory of it is without high value. Indeed the very certainty with which in thinking they drew their conclusions and in action made their choices presents a fascinating challenge to the later speculative thinker.

Hugh Miller's famous chapter in *The Testimony of the Rocks*, entitled 'The Geology of the Anti-Geologists,' might well suggest a supplement on 'The Philosophy of the Anti-Philosophers.'

In the Study.

Virginibus Puerisque.

Leaving Your Mark.

By the Reverend N. H. G. Robinson, B.D., D. Litt., Rothesay.

'And the Lord set a mark upon Cain, lest any finding him should kill him.'—Gn 4^{15}.

You remember of course what had just happened? Cain had killed his brother Abel, he had left his mark upon Abel, a mark of anger, jealousy and hate. Then God punished Cain by casting him out and making him a fugitive. But Cain complained that the punishment was too heavy to bear and that others would kill him. So God set a mark upon him that he should not be killed, a mark which would remind others of God's will, a mark of mercy and kindness and love.

People are constantly leaving their mark upon the minds and lives of others, sometimes good, sometimes bad, sometimes indifferent. It is related that a Scots doctor was once visiting in Spain and came to an outlying province of the country where he was entertained by a wealthy landowner. After dinner, his host said that as a special honour a Spanish girl would dance a very old and peculiar dance which was known only in that part of the country and had been carefully handed down from one generation to another. The Scots doctor was, of course, greatly interested, but as the dance proceeded he became positively excited, and at length asked if he might be allowed to join in the dance. His host was amazed and said, 'You cannot possibly know this dance of ours since you have never been here before; but if you wish you may try.' The doctor rose immediately from his chair and to the great wonder of all present he joined perfectly in all the movements of the dance. But can you guess what dance it was? It was the Highland Fling, left by Highland soldiers many, many years before when they had fought in the Peninsular Wars. They had left their mark.

Now let us leave Spain behind and let us go northwards as Spanish ships have often done in the past. Let us go as far north as a little island not many miles from Shetland, a little island called Fair Isle, and of course you know for what that island is famous. It is the Fair Isle pattern, that gaily coloured pattern that you see in knitted jumpers, gloves, and berets. Perhaps you think, however, that it was invented by the people of that island? But no, they received it several hundred years ago when ships of the Spanish Armada were driven northwards and cast ashore on that rocky coast and their sailors took refuge amongst the inhabitants. They were kindly treated, and in gratitude, it is said, they taught the islanders that curious pattern. Like the Highland soldiers, these Spanish sailors left their mark.

But now let us come south again, this time to Brittany in France; and if we went to sea with the sailors of that province we should find that almost all had a favourite prayer. 'Oh my God, help me; for my boat is so small, and Thy sea is so great.' Where did the prayer come from? They got it from an Irishman who also visited parts of Scotland fourteen hundred years ago. His name was St. Brendan; and St. Brendan too, you see, left his mark.

There, then, are three marks: a dance, a pattern, and a prayer. Which was the best? Wasn't it St. Brendan's, a mark of kindness and goodness and mercy which would remind men of God their Father in heaven, even in the most troubled times, even in the fiercest of storms? That's the kind of mark that God wants us to leave on other people, on their lives and on their minds. That's the kind of mark we ought always to leave; and that exactly is what Jesus meant when He said, 'Let your light so shine before men that they may see your good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven.'

Prayer at a Service when Youth Organisations are Present.

O God to whom the Psalmists of old sang praise,
rejoicing in Thy fatherly pity and care,
as we take their words on our lips,
may we too have grateful hearts;
for Thy mercy endureth for ever,
and in Jesus Christ we have the full and glorious revelation of Thy love.

O Lord our God,
to whom we stretch out our hands in worship,
stoop down to us and make us sure that Thou art near.
We need Thee in the morning of our days,
when life is full of hope;
and midway on our course,
when the work is great and the load is heavy;
and still we need Thee when the shadows lengthen,
and there is but a little way to go.
Unite us all, young and old together,
in reverence and faith.

We praise Thee that we are gathered here,
as a congregation of Thy Church,
as companies of girls and boys,
to strengthen one another's hands in God,
and learn to know and do Thy will.
We bless Thee for all that is joyful in life;
that we dwell not in loneliness or silence,
but with love and laughter among friends,
with fine things to learn and useful work to do.
We thank Thee that, when sorrows visit us,
we have the comfort of Thy word.

Most holy God, we ask Thy forgiveness,
for we have been selfish and greedy, sulky and unkind;
we have turned away from the teaching of Jesus,
and chosen to do wrong.

O God, who sent Jesus Christ to save us,
that we might know and love and obey Thee,
Let us not be like the cruel men who killed Him,
but, like Mary, who sat at His feet,
like the disciples who followed Him,
and heard His word.

Kindle within us desires after goodness.
May we love our friends better than money,
be more eager to do our duty than to win praise.
May our hearts be generous and sympathetic,
cherishing the love of justice,
and full of pity for the weak.
Let unclean and wicked things be hateful to us,
but the law of the Lord our delight.
Let the love of our Lord Jesus Christ
shine in our hearts and show in our deeds.
And at the end of our days, O Lord,
receive us into Thy heavenly Kingdom
through Jesus Christ, our Lord. AMEN.

The Christian Year.

FOURTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

Latent Compensations.

BY THE REVEREND JOHN L. KENT, M.A., CATHCART, GLASGOW.

'But I would ye should understand, brethren, that the things which happened unto me have fallen out rather unto the furtherance of the gospel.'—Ph 1^{12}.

The man in the street often speaks more wisely than he knows. His words have implications he cannot see. When, for example, he meets a disconsolate friend he will sometimes slap him on the shoulder and say, 'Cheer up, brother, it's a long road that has no turning.' He has really passed a judgment of the government of the world and does not realize it. Or when he tries to revive his own drooping spirits by declaring, 'There never was a dark cloud that had no silver lining,' he is again making a pronouncement about the providential order, the significance of which he does not suspect.

He is really asserting that adversity and calamity fall under a control that uses them for good ends. Buried at the heart of every predicament that tortures the soul lies a beneficent purpose that is being served. The cloud has its silver lining.

At any rate that is what the Apostle Paul is saying. He had been put in chains and committed to a prison cell. Surely this was disastrous enough both for himself and for the Church. The restless, tempestuous spirit of Paul was the least likely to take kindly to the helpless inactivity of a prison; and the Church must have felt utterly at a loss bereft of the guidance and inspiration of its leader. A catastrophe indeed! 'Yet this is what I have discovered,' he cries. 'My imprisonment is being transmuted by the genius of God into an incredible blessing. You should see them—these timid and shifty brothers of ours suddenly galvanized into heroic activity, facing menacing hostility without blenching, compelling the sneering crowd to listen with reverent attention by the sheer, uncalculating courage with which they witness to Jesus Christ. Nothing could have done it, nothing could have transformed them from craven, shuddering mortals into potential martyrs but my imprisonment. I want you to understand how my bonds have turned out to the progress of the gospel. Out of this misfortune God is bringing good. No prison, no progress!'

It would appear that life has been so arranged that it is only in situations that make the severest demands that God's beneficence is revealed and realized. We are subjected to pressures and confronted with choices that wrack the soul and, lo! God's succouring grace rises to embrace and vindicate us. Decisions are forced upon us—take this or take that, accept or reject, submit or rebel, act or abstain—and when we respond in faith, believing that this is God's call to the soul, behold God's good purpose comes to light. Latent in every dire experience are compensations, strengthening, enriching, and beautifying. To the dark cloud a silver lining.

Pre-eminently this is the conviction of the Christian. The disciple of the Lord Jesus Christ is prepared to withstand the rude shock of life's shattering blows because he believes that this is the way God fashions the soul. He is ready to voyage the most perilouss eas at his Lord's behest because His is the service in which there is perfect freedom. He will take up his cross daily because

he knows that he that loseth his life for Jesus' sake finds it.

You can see how our testings carry with them God's good purposes when you look at Paul in prison. It meant a chastening, if not for him then for his friends. Their fearfulness was reproved, their timorousness exposed. When they saw Paul in his bonds they were conscience-smitten. 'Shame on us,' they cried, 'that we have been so cowardly. Had we made a bolder stand, declared openly whose we are and whom we serve, may be Paul had not suffered.' And out into the open they rushed, startling the city with their declarations of allegiance. This is the light in which the Bible regards catastrophe. It is God's dealing with men so as to chasten them. They have failures of which to be convicted, wrongs of which to be judged and sins for which to be condemned. And how can these failures, wrongs and sins be brought home to the human heart but through some experience that strips men of their pride and leaves them smarting with the pain of frustration. Grief and loss are the refiner's fire, burning up the dross and preserving the gold. They are the flail, separating the chaff from the grain. That is how men interpret their troubles who have taken the Bible view of God's dealings with them.

Of course many of us are too obstinate to see God working in this way in our trials. 'Do you believe in evil now?' Carlyle asked Emerson as he conducted him round the worst slums in London. But the other, we are told, remained blandly unshaken, refusing to see what he did not want to see. We too can be as blind to the real root of our unhappiness. We will ascribe our failures to all sorts of causes but rarely to ourselves. Politicians are to blame, not we. Capitalists are at fault, not we. Ecclesiastics are the sinners, not we. All the while a merciful God is searching us out, pointing to our follies and vices, seeking to put us right. 'Look! See! your stupid pride, your blind prejudice, your callous greed, your unsatisfied selfishness. That is where your trouble lies.'

To men who can see God working in this manner in their tribulations, life takes on a different aspect. Its strange, seemingly arbitrary visitations have a good purpose to serve. They purge the soul.

But sometimes the refining purpose of adversity may not be very clear and indeed may not exist. What then? Surely this. God's intention must be of another character. Through strain and challenge He has other ends to attain.

General MacArthur stood on the deck of the battleship *Missouri* and, addressing the Japanese who were offering their nation's surrender at the close of the World War, he said: 'We have had our last chance. If we do not now devise some greater and more equitable system Armageddon will be at our door. The problem is basically theological and involves a spiritual recrudescence and improvement of human character. . . . It must be of the spirit if we are to save the flesh.' It was an unprecedented utterance with which to conclude a war but the truth in it is a commonplace on the lips of multitudes. Our hopes for the future depend on a revolution in human character. We know it and say it. What we do not recognize is that the essential conditions of this elevation of our moral life are those, not of ease but of hardness. That the human spirit may grow 'to a lordly great compass within' fierce adversity is indispensable.

For the Apostle Paul prison bonds were not necessary to reveal his errors or to purge his soul; but they were required to produce his character. Look at the man glorying in his chains because they meant the furtherance of the gospel. What else could have created such radiant, invincible virtue? 'My bonds.' This is how God makes the character that changes the world.

Yes, we want the character but not the conditions of its creating. 'Give us a break,' is the cry of our day. 'We've been on the strain long enough; let us relax. Lift the controls! Lower the taxes! Let us slip even one knot in our tightened belts.' It is not the way in which enhanced character is secured. We do not say that we ought to court disaster but we must endure hardness. Adversity is the workshop in which God beats out the character essential for salvation.

This is God's strategy. He thrusts man into the lists that against unrelenting adversaries he may achieve his soul. Therefore, however hard our lot, however stern the forces arrayed against us, if we have faith, we see at their heart not the senseless action of wild disorder but the wise providence of God who is shaping the soul though by the sharp tool of affliction.

But is this all? Is the clue to the dark misfortunes of our human lot to be found merely in the chastenings and discipline of God? What of the buffetings pursued with unremitting fury giving no hint of a good purpose whatever? We are bound to ask the question for the facts are there for all to see. Read the eleventh chapter of Second Corinthians. Mark off each item in Paul's catalogue of calamities—his perils and persecutions, his stonings and shipwrecks, his labour and travail, his hunger and thirst, his cold and nakedness. Was he not tempted to ask if it really was worth while enduring all this to be brought at last to a gaol and faced with imminent extinction?

To that question we are confident Paul had his

answer ready. The man who preached Christ crucified had the one and only way of dealing with such a doubt. For there is no tidy little argument that will give the final quietus to all the disturbing, tantalizing, soul-shaking interrogations that arise from life. The only answer is that of faith. Are we only to believe in the wisdom and goodness of Almighty God if He can show us such reasons as will convince our feeble intelligence? Are we to trust the strange Disposer of our ways only if He can produce evidence that will satisfy our warped moral sense? Must the Most High God conform to conditions that we set down before we can believe in Him?

Here indeed is where faith brings its light to scatter our darkness. We must all come some time to the point at which we recognize that God has an unconditional claim upon us. We are made for God, not to have our questions answered, our fears dispelled, our wrongs righted, our wounds healed, our souls saved, but merely for God Himself. Manifold are the ways by which God brings us to this recognition but in the main He awakens this home-sickness for Himself when we lie in the dust, life's glory dead. That is where the Cross makes its impact for Paul and for us. 'He that spared not his own Son . . . shall he not with him also freely give us all things?' That is Paul's answer. At the Cross, the point of final challenge, faith meets its ultimate test, and when we say: 'Though he slay me, yet will I trust in him,' we discover that in His will is our peace. We are calmed and composed. We have fulfilled the purpose of our creation. Surely that is compensation indeed!

FIFTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

Success in Failure.

BY THE REVEREND PROFESSOR HAROLD ROBERTS, M.A., Ph.D., RICHMOND, SURREY.

'And we know that all things work together for good to them that love God, to them who are called according to his purpose.'—Ro 8^{28}.

It is important that we should ask ourselves what we mean by success. To succeed, in the generally accepted sense, is to accomplish the task on which you have set your heart and mind. You sit for an examination and receive a note to say that you have been a successful candidate. Perhaps you are an engineer and for years you have been striving to solve a specially intricate problem. One day you attain your end and you have the satisfaction that comes of success. It may be that you are what is described as a successful business man. That means your business pays and that you have succeeded in persuading a sufficiently large number of clients that what you have to offer is a good proposition. Success, then, as commonly understood is the attainment of an end or goal.

The Christian, however, cannot leave the matter there. He is concerned to ask what the end is which a man seeks to attain. You may gain your heart's desire and be known by your fellows as a shining success while, from the Christian standpoint, you cannot be described other than as a failure. It needs to be recognized that life does not always prevent us from achieving our ends even though they may be morally wrong. One of the tragedies of life is not that so many people fail to fulfil their ambitions but that so many succeed. We speak much of frustration and tend to think that if we were all given a clear course to follow our own bent we should find complete happiness. In point of fact many live to repent of their success. If only, they complain, there had been some writing on the wall to warn them that they were pursuing wrong ends. Dives, we recall, implored Abraham to send Lazarus to his brothers to impress upon them the delusive character of their success lest they should discover when it was too late that success can sometimes be another name for failure. When a man achieves what looks like success, said the late F. A. Atkins, he would be wise to interrogate it firmly and to ask whether it is a genuine success or that spurious and shabby success which so closely resembles a bedraggled failure.

It looks as though we ought to consider not only whether we have achieved our ends but whether those ends are worth achieving. The standard of reference is given to us in the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. Whatever our particular sphere of interest or activity may be, there is one question that is universally applicable. How far is my life making for the fulfilment of the purpose of God? The Christian theology of success affirms in no uncertain tones that what matters is God's purpose for me and for the world. I am a success in so far as that purpose, which is that I and others through me should grow in the image of Christ, is being fulfilled. I may achieve power, wealth, and even knowledge, but unless I am marching in step with the will of God, at the end of the day failure will be written over my life. On the other hand, either owing to the force of circumstances or some natural defect, I may be a failure in the eyes of men. But if I desire above all else the victory of God in me and in others, the world's verdict need not be feared. 'And who is he that will harm you,' as the Epistle for this day reminds us, 'if ye be followers of that which is good.'

It is plain enough that the Christian whose heart

is set upon doing the will of God is not delivered from frustration. There seems, indeed, to be a twist in human life. Things turn out so differently for us all from what we had hoped. The Bible begins with the story of a garden, but before long the peace of the garden is turned into conflict and sorrow. The tragedy of the Cross quite early casts its shadow over the human scene. It is as though man is a misfit in the universe, condemned to battle with forces which drive him into situations which are the reverse of what he himself would choose. Memory and imagination without which knowledge could not be achieved become the occasion of untold misery and mental maladjustments. Every new friendship made lays us open to a fresh possibility of suffering and loss. It is because not only Shakespeare or Milton is irreplaceable but also plain John Smith that the fact of death is felt to be a staggering blow.

There is, we must frankly admit, more frustration in the world than there need be. Hopes may be shattered and plans come to nought not because there is something wrong with the world but because there is much that is wrong with man. If you could eliminate greed, covetousness, pride, ignorance, there would be considerably less suffering and many an enterprise inspired by God would come to fruition. Failure in the sense of frustration by circumstances or by the sin and ignorance of man is not organized by God in the interests of our spiritual well-being. Is God then at the mercy of a world that can flaunt His will ? The Christian answer is that the universe is so guarded that to them that love God everything works together for good. Once you see in Christ the revelation of man's good, of what God intended man to be, you begin to find a place for the ministry of frustration.

What we sometimes describe as failure can be taken up into the purpose of God. It can become a platform from which the invincible power of Divine love is proclaimed. You may have been prevented from following the career you had planned. In the career that has almost been forced upon you by circumstances you can, in companionship with Christ, be used to accomplish greater things than would have been possible in the sphere which you yourself might have chosen. You may have suffered loss or your dreams been rudely shattered. It is Christ with hands and feet that bear the print of the nails that enables us, if we will, to weave these experiences into the Divine design. But that won't wipe out the loss or make the dreams come true. No, but it will alter the meaning of events and make our life a channel of faith, hope, and love. We shall have a share in the ministry of redemptive love.

One of the most potent arguments in support of the conviction that love is at the heart of things is that there is no situation in life which need exclude the manifestation of love. There is something sinister about physical suffering, and glib solutions of what we call the problem of suffering are not only indefensible but repellent. But when suffering is used redemptively, it awakens within us something akin to reverence and awe. Many who know little of Dr. Inge's contributions to theology, philosophy, and social science, often turn with lasting gratitude to his chapter on bereavement in the volume entitled *Personal Religion and the Life of Devotion.* He tells the story of his daughter Paula. On her last Palm Sunday on earth the Dean repeated to this child of eleven who had been ill for eighteen months Milton's sonnet on his blindness. When he came to ' They also serve who only stand and wait ' he thought it right to say, ' Paula, I should like you to remember that last line. You will never know how much you have done for all of us in this house and for many others simply by being what God has helped you to be.' Neither Nature nor man can destroy love. Neither can prevent us, by the grace of God working in us, from taking hold of the obstacles they place in our path and converting them into sacraments of Divine love.

The sanction of the Christian view of success is the Cross of Christ. From one point of view the Cross is a failure which presents an apparently insoluble difficulty for those who believe in the goodness and power of God. Perfect love is crucified in a world of which the Creator is God, the Father Almighty. All the forces of evil combined to frustrate the purpose of God and it looked as though God Himself had failed. From another point of view the Cross vindicates the providential rule of God. It is God's own proof of the omnipotence of love. He who was the image of the invisible God tore the veil from the heart of God that the love which was opposed to evil in every form and that yearned to forgive might be made plain. He remained love to the end. Willingly He went to the Cross. Willingly He remained there allowing sin to do its worst until His work was done. The Cross brought God and sin together. Sin is condemned, for the Cross confronts us with the judgment of God. But the last word need not be judgment. Our Lord died that men might be reconciled to God and share in the life that was obedient unto death. To share in that life is to know the power of the Resurrection. Those who walk with Christ in the path of obedience look beyond this world to another which provides an ampler sphere for the purpose of God. It is a sphere in which Divine love will perfect in us and others the work here begun. ' Because I live, ye shall live also.' We know that about this life and the life beyond. It is all we need to know.

SIXTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

The Weightier Evidence.

BY THE REVEREND K. H. TYSON, M.A., B.D., LAUSANNE.

'If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead.'—Lk 16^{31}.

One would have thought that a man's rising from the dead had been sufficient to persuade any man, anything. But no! says Jesus—'if they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead'—*i.e.* if they heed not the weightier evidence, they certainly will not heed the lesser. In the judgment of Jesus, Moses and the prophets are of more account than a rising from the dead.

This is a strange and unexpected judgment. One doubts if the majority of men would agree with it; and it is more than likely that we often enough reject it in practical life. How often we cry, not for Moses and the prophets, but for a rising from the dead—for the clear manifestation, through sensible signs, of spiritual reality that shall compel belief, make walking by faith as easy as walking by sight and render all hesitancy, perplexity, and doubt ludicrous and indeed, impossible.

Now doubtless there is wondrous sympathy in the heart of Jesus for this craving for a sign, for this sometimes frenzied demand to have all doubts overborne by some tremendous external event. And yet, it is a craving that He not only refuses to satisfy but judges to be wrong. 'It is an evil and adulterous generation that requireth a sign and no sign shall be given unto it.'

What lies behind this judgment of Jesus? Why should He refuse to give a sign that, we fancy, would disperse our unbelief and override our doubts by tangible evidence that could not be gainsaid? I suggest that Jesus rejects the demand for a sign and regards the craving for it as wrong, for three reasons.

First, He regards such a sign as *unnecessary*. 'You have,' He might say, 'Moses and the prophets and their disciples—an unbroken line of great hearts and minds that witness to God and spiritual reality. These men were neither fools nor charlatans; their speech was plain and direct; they feared not them that can kill the body; they preached the righteousness of God and the vanity of everything and every purpose contrary to Him. Whether you accept or reject the witness of these men, in your social and individual life they have been your instructors. And if you will ponder their witness and your life's story in the light of it, you will find that your experience corroborates what they had to say—their witness to God and the rule of God.

'Furthermore, there is the inner witness of your own soul. You may often long for some shattering demonstration that love, mercy, goodness and truth are indeed upon the throne, but what of your unqualified automatic approval of such things. You even approve when a man casts away his life for the sake of them. What does this approval of yours mean but that *now*, in this present material world, you are aware of and respond to unseen spiritual reality?—*i.e.* that you know *now* in your own experience the vital demands of the rule, the will of God?'

'In addition to these "signs" do you really want another sign—the witness of a tremendous event, a rising from the dead? Is an event more tremendous than the constant pressure of the unseen, of non-material considerations, of God, upon your life, possible? Their pressure is so much a "constant" that, like the air you breathe, you do not notice it, you do not reflect upon it, you take it for granted.

'When you have the light of the sun, is not the thin pale light of the moon rather unnecessary?'

Secondly, Jesus implies that were a sign given it would prove to be *useless*. 'If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead.'

'If you treat the witness of great hearts and minds lightly,' He might say 'if you will not heed the inner witness of your own soul, if you wilfully discount your own moral discernment and insight, if My words, life and death, and the testimony of My people, mean nothing to you, then, let there be no mistake about it, no other sign will serve you. A rising from the dead might amaze you and fill you with awful dread but it would only do so momentarily. It would not of itself quicken your spirit; it would not convert your soul, refashion your heart or cleanse your conscience; it would not make you alive to the Kingdom of God. That Kingdom or rule of God is only spiritually discerned; man only knows it through its moral impact upon and challenge to his soul.'

'You think a rising from the dead would quicken men's concern about their own survival after death. But such concern is not necessarily good and commendable. The Kingdom of God is not merely the sphere of man's survival, it is not selfish concern for one's own survival that gives entry into it—such concern might only be a kind of self-centredness trying to lay a claim on eternity. The Kingdom of God is not the Kingdom of men who, by prudence or some technique, manage to survive after death; it is for those who lose self in the love and service of God.'

'If you hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will you be persuaded though one rose from the dead; that "rising" would be a useless sign. The only "sign" that can mean anything is the tremendous fact of life's spiritual nature *now*; if you will not heed and respond to that, you will respond to nothing; if that carries to your heart and mind no conviction, nothing else will.'

It is worth noting that it is not those who lay claim to strange psychical experience and who are most affected by so-called spiritualistic evidences that are outstanding as servants of God or are remarkable for their wisdom, assurance, and peace in the face of death. Those who serve best and know the victory that overcometh the world and death are those who heed Moses and the prophets, their own conscience and the witness of the Holy Spirit in their hearts.

Thirdly and finally, Jesus regarded the crying for a special sign of God as *wrong* because He discerned that those most clamant for some overwhelming demonstration of God are those who, despite all their clamour, really do not want any such sign; they are those who will not admit truths, castigating truths already known—persons who deliberately turn from the witness of Moses and the prophets and their own conscience, because such witness challenges and rebukes purposes dear to their hearts and convicts them of sin. Their demand for a sign is an attempt to put the onus of what is, in fact, wilful unbelief upon God; it is an excusing of moral insincerity and culpable spiritual blindness.

Is not this the essential reason for Jesus' rejection of the demand for a sign? Let us suppose you wish to follow a certain line of conduct; you know it is wrong; your conscience cries out that it is wrong. But there are other voices crying besides your conscience. You look upon it as Eve looked upon the forbidden fruit; you find it desirable; you begin to argue with your conscience; ultimately you say to yourself, 'If this is wrong then it is up to God to step in, to act and stop me.' But God does no such thing. He does not stop you. He gives no sign. The fact is His sign has already been given in the uneasiness of your heart, mind, and conscience.

Must we all not say that we are guilty of such high-handed rebellion against the truth and, in honesty, must we not admit that our clamour for some special sign from God is a dishonest clamour whereby we would bluff our own hearts?

Maybe this is not the whole story. Not all crying for a mighty disclosure of God is so plainly and deliberately wrong. Often it is borne in the bitterness of sorrow and pain and the anguish of perplexity. Yet even so the sign is not given. And that, not because God is indifferent to man's sorrow and pain and anguish, but because one purpose in our life's discipline and experience is to bring us to trust the Father. In the wise purpose of God to walk by faith is not a second best thing, inferior to walking by sight; *it is that to which He would bring us.*

Trust and confidence, the fruits of spiritual perception and awareness, are what He would fain have in His children's heart.

SEVENTH SUNDAY AFTER TRINITY.

The Ministry of Compassion.

BY THE REVEREND HAROLD G. NEWSHAM, M.A., EDINBURGH.

'A cup of cold water only in the name of a disciple.' —Mt 10^{42}.

The humanitarian endeavours which have been inspired by Jesus Christ require no emphasis. Their number and diversity, their magnitude and costliness, are now beyond reckoning. They derive from Him whose loveliest name after 'Good Shepherd' is 'Divine Physician.' The disciples of One who 'went about doing good' cannot but engage in the ministry of compassion. The Parable of the Great Assize, with its unforgettable 'inasmuch as ye did it not unto one of these least, ye did it not unto me,' rings down the ages as the Voice of the Moral Order of the universe.

The prominence of practical benevolence, indeed, is so notable in the teaching of Jesus that not a few people have been tempted to regard it as the whole of Christianity. 'If I am trying to do good; to do as I would be done by; isn't that to be a Christian?' It must be remembered, however, that this emphasis upon practical service in the teaching of our Lord was necessitated by the false importance accorded to ritual and ceremonial and non-ethical activity in the religion of His day. It could produce Priests and Levites who could pass by on the other side. It could produce a perversion of true religion which could regard the doing of good on the Sabbath as evil. That had to be hit hard; and Jesus dealt with it faithfully.

But there are other words of Jesus which raise an important question about the ministry of compassion. Is there, by any chance, some secret of doing good, without which our doing good may be seriously imperfect? Is there some faith we needs should have as well as love—some faith, perhaps, from which alone the truest and strongest love can come? Is there—let us not shirk the issue—some adoration and worship, some creed even, which should be ours, if the cup of cold water is to do all it might do?

There are passages in the Gospels which powerfully imply that there is. For example, there is the story of the Transfiguration. It is true that part of its lesson is a rebuke to Peter for his impulsive idea that it would be good to stay on the mountain top indefinitely. The vision was for the valley; for life's strain and stress and tumult. Yes, but when Jesus descended into the valley He immediately came upon a group of dismayed disciples, impotent, floundering, at their wit's end. Jesus came to their aid; and as He did so, He spoke earnest words about prayer. Here was an act of compassion that only one who had been on the mountain with God could perform. We are left with the haunting impression that the more urgent lesson of the entire incident is not so much that religion must descend into the valleys of suffering and need, as that compassion to be wholly triumphant must ascend the mountain to gain the power which adoring communion with God alone can give. Humanitarianism, that is to say, must have wider horizons than the immediate scene of its activity. It must from time to time be inspired by a Goodness and a Power other than man by himself can attain.

The same conviction is at the heart of the best known and simplest of all the Master's words; this about a cup of cold water. Even here, there is a phrase which is arresting. He does not say the gift may be given anyhow! He says it must be given in a certain spirit; 'in the name of a disciple.' Needless to say, this does not mean anything so absurd as that the cup must have the name of Peter, James, or John somewhere inscribed on it, much as they stamp 'British Railways' on their new crockery and cutlery. It does not mean that it must be explained to the recipient that he is being given this cup of water, or this hypodermic injection, or this timely gift of money, because you are a disciple of Jesus Christ. No, it simply means that the gift is given with a certain conviction and consecration at the back of it. It is the gift of a Christian.

'But what difference can that conceivably make?' it will be asked. So long as the cup of water is given, and it is a clean cup, and the water is the purest obtainable, does it matter a straw whether it is given 'in the spirit of a disciple' or not? The question is important. It is urgently relevant to the entry of the State into the philanthropic field. The ultimate result may not impossibly hinge upon the spirit behind the welfare work of the State. Or upon the continuance of Christian activities augmenting that work. It may make all the difference in the world whether it is done 'in the spirit of a disciple,' or merely by agents whose pay depends upon their competence in the job.

But why? For three reasons, at least.

First, because in the long run, over a period perhaps of several generations, it must make a vast difference to humanitarian services whether they are performed in the belief that man is of the dust only, destined for utter dissolution in a few score years at most, or whether they are performed in the conviction that every man is within the eternal concern and compassion of God, born for an imperishable inheritance. Not that materialistic atheism would immediately strangle human generosity and sympathy and sacrifice. Of course not. But it is more than doubtful how men's most daring visions and supremest sacrifices for human good would fare in such a climate. Roses do not flourish on icebergs. The experience of our own time in Germany and in Russia is that the State can decide to liquidate multitudes of men and women for any reason which seems expedient. Mass murder can be deemed merciful, and genocide compassionate—in the interests of the greater number or the selected few! Humanitarianism alone is not to be trusted. Great deeds for man are the offspring of great beliefs about man. And great beliefs about man are the consequence of a living faith in the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.

A second reason why it is important that behind philanthropy there should be 'the spirit of a disciple' is this. The root of so many of our social problems is moral and not merely physical. The paralytic who could not be cured until his burdened conscience was relieved is typical. Social welfare work, medicine and surgery, economic reforms, political plasters and poultices, these are of much value. But something much more is needed by our ailing world. Greed and selfishness and a sinister company of evil passions darken the human scene. So our cups of water need to be given 'in the spirit of a disciple'; a spirit mindful of the sin which is at the root of so many ills, and certain of the remedy. Thus, the giving of a cup of water to one who is athirst is not enough. It must be given 'in the spirit of a disciple,' because the disciple knows of some Living Water which can remove the needless pangs and satisfy the deeper thirst which they often conceal.

Finally, there is this further reason why the faith behind the compassion is so vital. Modern analysis makes it clear that much of what passes for sympathy is really self-pity. The root motive why I give the cup of water may be my own fear of thirst. I give to the beggar because I am afraid of poverty. I may visit the sick or the lonely because of my own dread of illness or of solitude. Now that does not make our gifts

worthless. But it makes them much less valuable. We give the greater gift, said Dr. James Reid, when we bring a spirit with us which could actually be victorious in the very circumstances of him with whom we are sympathizing. If the friend of the lonely has found the peace and the companionship of Christ in his own necessity, his friendship will bring added strength. It is this kind of sympathy and compassion which is the secret of the Christian. No demand upon him can find him without the contagion of faith and hope. Even when the thirst of the needy is such that no cup of water can avail aught, and no human skills can do anything more, he can still stand by as a tower of strength. His eyes upon a distant hill outside a city wall, he has the faith that beyond all midnights comes the dawn and beyond all affliction an 'exceeding and eternal weight of glory.' Such faith communicates itself.

Water he can no longer bring. But what if somehow he brings God!

Limitations of Christ's Human Body.

By the Reverend John Baker, B.A., B.D., Batley, Yorkshire.

The Christian believes that God has created men and women to be His children. It follows that the children are able to think like the Father, though they will never grow to be as He is, since He is always Father and Creator, and they will ever be His children: nothing can change that relationship. It does mean, however, that the Father is so like the children in *consciousness* (*i.e.* in all that is understood by the word 'personal') that it is not so difficult to conceive of the Son of God becoming incarnate, *i.e.* voluntarily accepting the limitations of the children's environment, and entering their world.

It must be admitted that the physical body of Christ raises questions which are not solved by acceptance of the similarity between Christ and man in the matter of consciousness. From that similarity it would be possible to argue only that Christ was equivalent, at least, to a disembodied human person—taking for granted that a human being could exist in a disembodied state. For that does not by any means effect the transition of Christ into human existence as we understand it—within a human body and in this world. On our view of Christ's Person, He existed as the pre-existent Son of God before His incarnation. If that be true there now confronts us the ultimate difficulty—How was it possible for a complete personality, such as Christ's, to be born into the world as a little child? We might even say that ultimately it is not so much a problem of Christ inhabiting a human body that presents the real difficulty. The most baffling part of the mystery lies in the question of His being a *baby*; of His existing, mature consciousness becoming a child, and then growing up in complete union with a human body. Is it connected with the common mystery of birth, with the first union of mind and body? For the body is not the origin, or the creator, of consciousness; nor is the consciousness the creator of the body—though the body has been created, we believe, for the self-expression and development of the consciousness. But what we do not know is the whole significance of the acceptance of the conditions of physical life by each consciousness. Since, according to the Christian standpoint, each human being is created anew as he enters the world—and is not, as in the Platonic theory, a soul being born from pre-existence into the temporary forgetfulness of earthly life where he gradually recollects the patterns of ideas 'laid up in heaven,' and so grows and matures in wisdom—the position of a human being at birth has no parallel. Birth, for man, is like a seed newly created within a suitable body, and both the seed (or consciousness) and the body grow together.

In the case of the Incarnation, however, there is the additional question of a full-grown consciousness being constricted into the unconsciousness of a child before and at birth, and gradually opening out during years of complicated adjustment to the environment. This is indeed a mystery we cannot fathom—though that does not mean that it is unfathomable. It is expressed for us in 'The Word *became* flesh.' The Eternal Christ was *born*. He negated His consciousness as if He were to sleep, and were to waken gradually to consciousness again with the growth of His human body—becoming man, and at the same time becoming as much of His Divine self as was possible within the limits of human life. It was in this mystery of birth that Christ 'humbled himself,' and 'emptied himself,' accepting the demands of the infant body

within which His embryonic consciousness was to be incarnate. We say 'was to be,' because the decision and the realization had to be made before the act, and did not exist during the act. Having decided, He became a child, and His Divine consciousness (in the accepted orthodox sense) as such ceased to exist. Christ *was not*, except in that unconscious embryo, and child, and young boy growing into manhood. Therein lies the obstacle to the intellectually curious. Whosoever can solve that mystery will solve, we believe, the outstanding modern difficulty of the doctrine of the Incarnation. Not the union of natures; not the mystery of Divinity becoming humanity in its mature consciousness; not the essential difference between Divinity and humanity; but the mystery of Christ's full consciousness compressing itself, as it were, so as to become in reality born anew into human life, and growing within a human body; accepting throughout His earthly life all the conditions of human life—physical, moral, and spiritual—and making natural contact all along, in growing degree, with the consciousness of God, whom He again, as it were, recognizes as His own Father; realizing also, at the same time, His unique, pre-human Sonship. Here is indeed the most difficult of all problems connected with the Incarnation. It is fortunate for us that 'faith o'erleaps the confines of our reason,' and that we can believe beyond what we can logically explain. Yet we cannot rest from our quest for truth even in this intimate matter of Christ's Person. One or two further points arise here, which we must needs follow. In the first place let us not neglect any analogy which might bear, even remotely, on this mystery of the restriction of the consciousness by the physical body, and earthly environment.

For example, it is interesting to consider the possible relevance of a comparison between Christ's birth, and His death. For, in His death, there happened to Christ that which happens to all men, and if death be looked on as a door, or experience leading to another existence, then what happens to the human consciousness in death may be parallel to what happened to Christ before His birth as a man. Death is undoubtedly a negating or obscuring of consciousness, in which a person is temporarily 'lost.' So, possibly, Christ's birth into human life meant for Him a death, a dying to His pre-incarnate state. That pre-incarnate state we can only imagine as being an existence in which His consciousness was perfectly free—and aware of all things by the act of *willing* to be aware, and having power to do all things by the act of *willing* to do them. It was, we imagine, a conscious state free from all limitation or constriction imposed by physical environment. But it was impossible for Christ to exist within a human body—*i.e.* a child's body—without completely cutting Himself off from His previous *freedom* of consciousness, just as (on a very inadequate analogy) a man who is confined to a small cell cannot see beyond the four walls, no matter how keen his sight or mature his intellect. To use a more accurate analogy, a man who loses his sight or his hearing is no longer able to see the beauty of Nature or hear the wonderful music his mind is still capable of appreciating. His consciousness is greater than his body, but it cannot overcome blindness or deafness, in spite of the fact that his consciousness is adequate to respond to a far wider and higher environment. To be *born* without sight or hearing is a handicap which a normal human consciousness is incapable of overcoming. True, there are ways of compensating such loss—as in the case of Helen Keller. But that does not remove the lack of sight or hearing, and the development of consciousness which follows from possession of those faculties. The physical body limits the consciousness.

On this analogy, the loss of sight or hearing is like a small part of death—it is a restriction of consciousness by the physical body. Consciousness, while still retaining *all* its potentialities, is imprisoned, in relation to the environment which is *beyond* the body. Consciousness is not destroyed, but it is limited by being joined to a body which has not the functioning organs of sight and hearing. Similarly, a child's body, before developing, is incapable of containing a mature consciousness. The brain of a child is not adequate for more than the essential functions. True, there is great latitude, as in the case of a prodigy, or genius. But even then there is a limit, so that in the case of babies under about two years of age we are back upon the essential basis, the point where the human body *cannot* contain more than a minimum of consciousness—though that minimum has within it the seed of all later growth and greatness. Looked at from the point of view of the mature consciousness, this is a *constriction*. All the possibilities are present in a normal child, though they have not yet flowered. Yet it is only time that stands between the embryo and the full-grown man or woman. But whereas each person is a newly created being, in Christ's case there is a very real constriction—from the full maturity of His pre-existence, to childhood, since in that incarnation He becomes in truth a child. He has the embryonic consciousness of a child, made unavoidable by the limitations of the body, though with all the potentialities of the Christ hidden in that tiny body.

Related to this is the fact that we are often *aware* of the cramping or limiting effect of the body upon our consciousness. Here is a real factor in this problem of the relationship of consciousness

and the body. There are times when we feel most active, mentally, and yet at the same time we have a sensation of being shut up in the body—accompanied by an acute feeling of frustration which is directly due to the body. Consciously, at such times, we feel a sluggishness of *brain* (of machinery, as it were!) hampering our thought—as of a physical weight pressing on one's consciousness and blocking the way to wider vision and deeper understanding of some truth upon which we are concentrating at the time. We feel that we are nearly breaking through to a higher level of understanding, and yet being prevented from reaching it by a physical, almost tangible fog. There are also ways by which this limiting of consciousness may be induced—by drugs, or ill-treatment, or by neglect of the whole personality, in abuse of oneself. In these cases there is also an effect upon the *quality* of the consciousness, in so much as the limitations are then the result of choice. The main point to be noted in all cases, however, is that the human body, by the necessity of its functions, has its proper authority and influence over the consciousness, and dictates certain conditions which are unavoidable owing to the nature of the body.

It is true that we may here be open to a charge of dualism, by making too severe a distinction between consciousness and body. Dr. William Robinson writes: 'Man is a *living soul* and not a spirit inhabiting a body. This latter is a Greek conception. The Hebrew, except in the later period under Greek influence, thought not of a spirit inhabiting a body, and of the body as the prison house of the spirit, but of a living personality. The whole of man was created by God, not just the spiritual side of him. The Bible, therefore, gives no countenance to that ethical dualism which divided between flesh and spirit and which is so characteristic of Iranian thought' (*Whither Theology?*, 105). Yet the New Testament is most emphatic in its view of the comparative unimportance of the body, and the immense superiority of the spirit, or soul. Is not Christ continually touching on this theme? For Him, indeed, the body is worthy of care and respect: it is the recipient of God's bounty and the means of service. Christ shows tenderness and pity towards it and stretches His healing hand to remove infirmity and disease. He shows Himself deeply concerned for the physical life of man, and the needs of the body. He shows no trace of the Greek, or stronger Iranian, attitude which regards the body as evil in itself. Yet Christ makes crystal clear His belief that the soul, the spiritual integrity—man as he is in his innermost being—is far more important than the body, and we cannot escape the conclusion that He wished man to realize that the soul is indeed something over and above the body, and in a definite way independent of it. 'Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than meat, and the body than raiment?' (Mt 6^{25}). 'And fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell' (Mt 10^{28}). In these and similar passages, where Christ stresses the need for the strictest discipline of the body for the sake of the soul, the body is seen as a medium for the growth of the soul, and its place is strictly subordinate—as something to be overcome, conquered, and finally, beyond death, outgrown in that state where we shall no longer be men and women, giving and being given in marriage, but independent of this body which makes such demands upon us in this life. In other words, Christ constantly reminds us of the cramping and restricting effect that the body has upon the growth and development of personality, and He stresses in no uncertain manner the need to combat this effect. He more than implies the existence of a sphere where the spirit is free of the hampering restrictions of the flesh, under which He too is forced to live His earthly life.

We cannot leave this matter of the limitations imposed on Christ by His body, and the purely human reactions demanded of Him by that body without considering two important difficulties, namely, those concerning suffering and temptation.

Let us first take the question of suffering, or pain. Did Christ suffer as other men suffer—or did the fact of His 'Divine' consciousness, in some way we cannot explain, make Him able to avoid or over-ride it? Many theologians have held that while God *feels concern*, it is unthinkable that He should *suffer* by having something inflicted upon Him—something which, being contrary to His will, could cause Him distress. Likewise, Christ (according to this view), though clothed in a human body, did not in His Divine consciousness suffer the pains of the body. Those pains were suffered in the human consciousness, which was separate, though in union with the Divine. This division of consciousness to safeguard the Divine impassibility was by some early theologians explained in terms of the doctrine of 'anhypostasia,' which meant that the human side of Christ was an almost impersonal humanity, and that it was on this level that Christ's human reactions were experienced. The weakness of this theory has been fairly dealt with by H. M. Relton (*A Study in Christology*) and D. M. Baillie (*God Was in Christ*, 90–93).

Since we believe Christ's consciousness to be one and undivided (see 'The Christological Problem,' in The Expository Times, lx. [April 1949], 176),

both Divine and human, it follows that Christ endured at least all that man endures, and in exactly the same way. Consciousness inhabits the body completely, as one organism (despite the awareness of the independence of the spirit). It is not like a man in a suit of armour, unaware of what touches the hard casing—but intertwined with, and growing in action and reaction with that body—a single being. If Christ's Divine-human consciousness is one, then its relationship to His human body will certainly not be *less* intimate than that of a normal man, since He wishes to make even finer use of it. His purpose was precisely to reveal God through the medium of the human body, and to show how much of the Divine character can express itself in human terms.

The exactions, demands, and constraints of the body upon His consciousness must be unconditionally recognized. It has long ago been pointed out that the sensitive man suffers pain more keenly than the hardened, more brutal, man, and we may add, in Christ's case, that the pains caused by physical agents also caused Him greater mental distress because of His greater realization of those actions performed by evil or thoughtless people. It is, however, debated that this increased sensibility to physical pain or suffering is offset by the incomparable advantage of His Divine consciousness, or at least by the fact that His perspective must be in some way different from that of sinful man. It is maintained that He had advantages which enabled Him to understand, and accept and deal with such suffering as no ordinary human being could.

Is such an argument really valid ? What are those attributes or qualities which are claimed to give Him an unfair advantage in His human existence as compared with other men ?

We believe that the essential truth about God revealed in Christ is that He is a Person : that whatever else His infiniteness, omnipotence, omniscience, etc., may mean, all these attributes are part of His wonderful Person, and are subsidiary, in a sense, to His Loving Selfhood. If we accept the revelation in Christ, the central truth about God is that above all else He is love and holiness, mercy and righteousness. Therefore we may say that *all* God's attributes are personal, since they are part of Him. Christ reveals what is essential in God, when He reveals God's personal character. Likewise, Christ Himself is a person : His selfhood, as it includes the human consciousness and that wider, though concentric, Divine consciousness of His, is most fully expressed in personal terms. If that is so, then in the whole of human experience, from ecstasy of joy to agony of suffering, what possible advantage does such ' Divinity ' give Christ over other men, except in infinitely greater sorrow when confronted with sin, as well as more intense joy in the presence of good, than other men can experience ? ' There is no sorrow like unto his sorrow.' He cannot escape from the reality of His humanity into a hypothetical abstraction of Divinity—for Divinity is even more intensely *personal*. Because He is Divine as well as human, He is more completely human than any man, for all man's experiences are the concern of the Father's Son, and not the least of those experiences are they which follow on pains inflicted on the human body.

Perhaps an even more important objection is that which credits Christ with moral immunity, setting Him above the tension created in the human consciousness by temptation. It has been stated that His will was so attuned to the purpose of His Father that He never once experienced the attraction of sin in any form. Such a view makes parts of the New Testament unintelligible. True, it is possible for the good will to identify itself with goodness so completely that many things that are temptations to one person hold no attraction for another. *But the good will is not identified with goodness until it has faced a moral issue*—a temptation—*and won a decisive moral victory*. It is in constant danger until it is tested, and has proved its complete mastery over a particular sin. It is through tension that moral goodness comes into being—at least on the human level. There are temptations which inevitably come to a normal, healthy, human being. Not to be tempted is to be abnormal. Temptations differ, but they come in some form to every man and woman. It is certain that those who claim to have felt little temptation are not found among the noble souls of history. Where there is little moral tension there is little growth, and little sympathy or understanding of the life of other people. Such was certainly not true of Christ. If we examine the story of Christ in the Gospels, can we have any doubt about the battles He had to fight within Him ? Apart from His great struggles in the Wilderness and in Gethsemane, there were times when the hatred and folly and blindness of people whipped His spirit into a tumult. We feel the surge of His emotions beneath the surface, and sense the tenseness of the battle. He, too, must have felt the temptations of the flesh in His healthy body, and He had overcome them before embarking on His ministry. He was sinless through conquest. Christ *chose* to be sinless ; *i.e.* He was sinless within a setting of moral freedom. There is no personality, as we understand it, without freedom to choose between right and wrong. The human body is the environment within which that freedom is exercised, and the

personality is able to develop. To be able to grow is to be open to moral choice, *i.e.* open to temptation. If Christ is to have relevance for human life in His Incarnation, then we cannot deny Him freedom of will—He cannot be above moral challenge. In His bodily existence He accepted the physical conditions which had their own subtle attractions. This meant deliberate choice for Him as for other men, and for Him also it was only the greater attraction of an alternative—the holy will and love of God—that enabled Him to overcome the temptations of the flesh, as it enabled Him to gain the victory in the Garden, and in the Wilderness.

Contributions and Comments.

Romans viii. 28.

In The Expository Times for November 1949 the Rev. Eric H. Daniell finds exegetical difficulties in the A.V. of Ro 8^{28}.

I would like to refer him to the Rev. E. C. Blackman's remarks in the number for May 1939, where the suggestion is made that Paul is here giving expression to a conception of Providence which was widely known in the first century A.D., and which had been popularized by the Stoics.

With regard to the philological difficulties of the verse, I may be pardoned for referring to my own note in the number for July 1938, where I showed that no single parallel can be adduced from the Greek of any period to the construction of συνεργῶ +the Dative of person+the Inner Accusative of respect+a prepositional phrase with εἰς, so that C. H. Dodd's translation 'With them that love Him God co-operates in everything for good' is unlikely, though not impossible.

I also showed that the causative use of συνεργῶ, which Mr. Daniell postulates is not unequivocally attested. Philologically, the translation 'Everything works together for good with them that love God' seems thoroughly sound; nor is it, on Professor Blackman's view, exegetically unlikely.

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κολοβοδάκτυλος.

The epithet 'stump-fingered,' which Hippolytus says was applied to St. Mark is surely best understood as referring to a physical disability—'either mutilated or stunted in one or more of his fingers.' So F. J. Rae, who wisely adds that the explanations offered for this infirmity of the flesh 'possess no probability.' [1] The deformity must have called attention to itself rather than to its cause. It would not raise deeper questions as the case of the man 'born blind.' [2] Though there may have been people down the centuries in the cities and towns of the Near East who tended to make capital out of their troubles, there must have been others able to sublimate their disfigurement without taking umbrage at being described in terms of the particular defect. After all, the disfigurement in question may have been honourably acquired; as would certainly be the case to-day with the respected and beloved Commander of the Arab Legion, who is known familiarly both sides of the Jordan by the sobriquet of *Abu Hunaik* [3]—through having sustained a facial wound. This use of *Abu* in common vogue through Arabic-speaking lands can be substantiated by reference to the glossary of books on the Near East.

The recent volume of H. R. P. Dickson, *The Arab of the Desert,* has a list of seven 'uses'—one of which *Abu Saiyaha* is applied to the 'white blaize' on a horse.[4] The compound turns up in the names for fish, animals, vegetables, and places,[5] accountable by some peculiar circumstance or characteristic. A man who wears spectacles would be 'nicknamed' *Abu 'n Nazzara*; or who wears a sheepskin *Abu Farwa.* We have even heard the sobriquet of *Abu Gold Teeth.* Abu may be used, too, in reference to a propensity. Thus a popular Jewish orthopædist in Jerusalem has been known for years by a large clientele of Arab patients and their friends as *Abu Jabsin* 'Father of Plaster,' due to his unfailing remedy of plaster-casts for healing broken limbs! If there is a difference between *Abu* and *Ibn* (son) in 'nicknaming,' perhaps the latter veers toward matters of character while the former is used for the more obvious allusions. The New Testament use of 'Bar' [6] mostly has implications of character. *Abu,* how-

[1] *D.C.G.*, ii. 120; cf. *H.D.B.*, iii. 247; Moulton and Milligan, 353; Swete's Commentary on St. Mark.

[2] Jn 9^{2}.

[3] Diminutive of *chin.*

[4] P. 604.

[5] For places Abu Hamid in the Sudan or Abu Sinan in Galilee.

[6] *E.g.*, Barnabas, Bartholomew.

ever, is something more tangible; and usage modern and presumably ancient would seem to support the application of 'stump-fingered' to St. Mark as implying something personal and obvious.

It is true that there are a couple of words Arabic might employ to render κολοβοδάκτυλος; one of them even meaning some one with a whole hand missing and the other more likely, with the implication of anything 'curtailed'—and used too in a metaphorical sense.[1] But it is more probable that the usual picturesque *Abu* with the appropriate noun in construction would be preferred—*Abu Maqtu'*—'Father of the severed finger.' In any case there could be nothing derogatory in a 'surname' of this description, but rather something distinctive, possibly even distinguished.

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[1] 'Aqta' and 'Abtar.

Entre Nous.

Herbert Hensley Henson.

'Reviewing is almost a lost art. Books are described more or less fairly, and their authors are referred to in a manner hostile or friendly. But there is rarely an attempt to consider or appraise their actual substance.' So Hensley Henson in the third massive volume of *Retrospect of an Unimportant Life* (Oxford University Press; 25s. net). But what is a reviewer to do when the book has hardly any substance? In this volume Henson has left his greatest days behind him; he is very old, and seriously blinded and sadly handicapped thereby; like most men in those war years, even he faced disappointingly meagre congregations, only a shadow of what he had known. It is all on a small scale. And sometimes he seemed to lose heart a bit, and faith in what he was attempting. 'Sermons are so patently and overwhelmingly futile, that no considering preacher can reflect without dismay that he has no other instrument therewith [ought this to be wherewith?] to wage His battle,' yet only two pages later he is sure that 'there are moments when words are the most potent facts, and this is one of them.'

The valiant fighter is not tamed. 'My own habit of ruthless recklessness in talk' is far from wholly corrected. Of Laud he remarks that he 'was destitute of any kind of originality—he was totally lacking in personal magnetism, and had an ungenerous impersonal nature. Nobody loved him, and he loved nobody.'

But contemporaries are not spared. 'Little short of a surgical operation would be necessary to induce Headlam to acknowledge that he had blundered.' Or this on Hugh Cecil—'I was astonished at the obsoleteness of his opinions, the subtlety of his arguments, and cast-iron rigidity of his mind. He is the medievalist in the methods of his reasoning, the strength of his prejudices, and the obscurantism of his outlook.' Yet, much as he differed from Gore, Henson commends him 'for his lack of venom,' and claims to have walked with him as friends in the House of God.

Baxter played a great part in Henson's mental history. After the manner of that master's 'Self Review,' one of the most honest things in literature, he too looks back over his life, wondering if here and here he acted rightly. A devoted supporter of an Establishment, after the Prayer Book incident he changed his mind. Yet, though it irritated him to be told it, he had only to look across the Border to find a Church Established and yet spiritually Free.

In the Articles of the Church of Scotland stands 'This Church has the inherent right, free from interference by civil authority, but under the safeguards for deliberate action and legislation provided by the Church itself, to frame or adopt its subordinate standards, to declare the sense in which it understands its Confession of Faith, to modify the forms of expression therein, or to formulate other doctrinal standards, and to define the relation thereto of its office-bearers and members, but always in agreement with the Word of God and the fundamental doctrines of the Christian Faith contained in the said Confession, of which agreement the Church shall be sole judge, and with due regard to liberty of opinion in points which do not enter into the substance of the Faith.' That has been specifically accepted by the State.

That liberty was won at the price of centuries of sacrifice for principle. And, perhaps, the Church of England cannot reasonably hope for it on easier terms. For his part, Henson was uneasy. 'I can not believe that the Church of England can much longer avoid disruption,' he writes gloomily.

An interesting part of the book is an open letter in which he undertakes to set down the crucial facts of his spiritual history, as distinct from his public services. It is frank and honest and moving. But, surely, curiously superficial. His musings on his ordination, for example, are quite oddly man-centred. There is little of those wonderful words

of Christ, 'Ye have not chosen me, but I have chosen you, and ordained you, that ye should go and bring forth fruit, and that your fruit should remain.'

On the whole, this book gives some validity to one of its own confident judgments: 'The world is a very odd place, and the oddest thing in it is the Christian Church.' A. J. Gossip.

Speaking to the Children.

In the May number of The Expository Times Dr. Gossip said 'many are pathetically futile at it,' but, he added, referring to the chapter on Children and Worship in Dr. Coffin's *The Public Worship of God*, 'they might find here a road leading them to better things.'

Dr. Coffin believes in a Ministry of the Word for children—something provided specially for their benefit in the Sunday morning service, and he suggests a number of suitable themes for a short series of talks. 'How the Gospel was carried to our Forefathers'; 'Modern Missionary Biographies'—'a useful source is *The Romance of Missionary Heroism*, by J. C. Lambert'; 'Great Christians'; 'Leaders of the Reformation.' The preacher has a vast advantage, in his opinion, when he has the assistance of an object. He gives several illustrations of how objects can be used tellingly, and we quote one of these.

'I was once quarantined in a ship for some days, and reduced for literature to what was at hand. The ship was Japanese, and the only book in English was a volume containing the international signal code. With its help, I watched the ships entering the harbor and read their signals. I drew the flags; and at home my wife cut them out of cardboard and painted them in the right colors. A masthead was rigged which could easily be lifted up and attached to a side of the pulpit, and the signals run up. One signal, which I saw repeatedly hung out from entering ships, read: "I need a pilot." It is not necessary to amplify that text. Another signal read: "Have you any combustibles on board?" (There were hostilities in Manchuria, and ammunition was being transported to the forces.) "One would think poorly of any man or woman, boy or girl, without a temper, or without strong feelings which blaze up in indignation against wrong. Our Lord chose an apostle with so hot a temper that once he could not control himself, but cursed and swore. It takes dynamite to blow tunnels through mountains. When the subway was being dug in New York City, one saw a wagon painted bright red and marked 'Explosives' driven through our streets. Drivers took care not to bump into it. But those explosives blasted the long passages through solid rock where we travel up and down town to-day. There was another signal, recorded in the code book just after this question, 'Have you any combustibles on board?' It read: 'Yes, but they are safely stored.' Temper, strong feelings, are most valuable if they are safely stored. Only One can do that for us." (A talk of this sort to be effective requires vividly delineated instances of combustibles which go off in human situations; and while this type of address holds the minds of children, there is ample chance to bring in an application or two for grownups—the boss, whose office boy says: "Watch out! The old man got up on the wrong side of the bed this morning. He's handing out huge chunks of his mind, and handing 'em out red hot.")

'Another set of signals has to do with depth. A vessel inquires, "How much water is there in the channel?" and in reply it is asked, "How many feet do you draw?" One need not amplify the application: shallowness in old and young is appallingly common in our land. One may put side by side with this illustration of depth our Lord's metaphor from agriculture, of the seed which fell on soil where there was "no deepness of earth," so that it could not form roots, and, while it made a momentary show, was soon "scorched" and "withered away," Matt. $13^{5.6}$. (A copy of the *International Marine Signal Code* may be found in most public libraries of any size.)'

Another new book should also prove of real help in the preparation of addresses to children. The author is the Rev. John Wilding, who has contributed on a number of occasions to 'Virginibus Puerisque.' It will be remembered what a high standard he set in those talks. The title of the volume is *Put in Your Hand* (Lutterworth Press; 5s. net), 'an open invitation,' Mr. Wilding says, 'to my fellow-ministers to help themselves to anything in the following pages that may be of service to them. Many of the ideas are fully worked out in the form of an address which either has been, or could be, delivered as it stands. But all that most of us require is "an idea." Give us something to work on and we can do the rest for ourselves. I simply offer here some ideas which have come to me in this most fascinating part of our work.'

Printed in Scotland by Morrison & Gibb Limited, Tanfield Works, and Published by T. & T. Clark, 38 George Street, Edinburgh. It is requested that all literary communications be addressed to The Editor, King's Gate, Aberdeen, Scotland.